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After several decades of thinking and 
action about development, controversy 
still persists over the objectives it should 
pursue and the means that should be 
adopted in order to secure it. 
This article does not pretend to put 
forward a solution of its own, but simply 
tries to suggest an existential conception 
of development, which is viewed as an 
unceasing effort to impose a rational form 
based on a particular set of values on an 
actual situation which does not readily 
lend itself to this. It begins by analysing 
the difficulties of defining and orienting 
development, both from the academic 
and the political point of view, and goes 
on to enumerate some of the recom-
mendations which have been made in this 
respect by the United Nations General 
Assembly and CEPM.. Subsequently, it 
makes a critical analysis of the uniform 
development requirements which emerge 
from these expressions of international 
consensus, notes their links with the 
present world order, and describes the 
position of the Latin American countries 
in this context. Finally, it distinguishes 
the main criteria which have been used 
to define the ends and means of develop-
ment (the utopian:normative, the techno-
cratic-rationalistic and the socio-political 
approaches) and concludes with a critical 
analysis of the agents of development. 
•Director. Social Development Division, CEPAL. 
1. 
"Development" under 




International discourse since the 1940s 
has postulated that the term "develop-
ment" refers to an intelligible process 
that can be furthered by rational action 
within the framework of nation-states 
— that is, by "planning". The partici-
pants in the discourse have disagreed 
radically with one another concerning 
the nature of the national and inter-
national orders within which development 
is to take place, in their evaluations 
of what is happening, and in their 
prescriptions for action. Variants on 
the vision of linear, progress, according 
to which the "developed" countries have 
both the capacity and the duty to help 
others follow in their own path, have 
continually clashed with variants on 
the vision of societal transformation, 
according to which the development of 
poor countries requires inter alia 
liberation from exploitative relationships 
that have made the "developed" countries 
rich and dominant. Nevertheless, 
arguments have proceeded within an 
implicit consensus that there can be 
only one kind of development: a process 
with certain societal preconditions, 
going through predictable stages, 
The present paper continues an exploration 
begun in "Development: Images, Conceptions, 
Criteria, Agents, Choices" (Economic Bulletin 




requiring accelerated capital accumu-
lation and technological-entrepreneurial 
innovation, leading to the formation of 
national societies and economies 
predominantly urban and industrial, 
imbued with "modern" attitudes towards 
the world and citizenship, capable of 
continually rising production of goods 
and services and, eventually, of ample 
satisfaction of the consumption demands 
of their members. It follows that there 
can be only one optimal way to develop; 
the task, then, is to define it, diagnose 
the deviations from it of the society in 
question, and prescribe means of setting 
that society on the correct path. 
At present, while the international 
machinery deriving from this interplay 
of conflict and consensus over develop-
ment continues to ramify and the list of 
internationally accepted requisites for 
development continues to lengthen, the 
view of development as a uniform 
definable sequence to which all national 
societies must conform under penalty 
of remaining poor and backward is being 
challenged from many different theoreti-
cal, ideological and valorative positions. 
Some critics question whether "develop-
ment" is a meaningful concept and trace 
it to an ethnocentric supposition of the 
duplicability of the experience of a few 
"Western" societies during a certain 
period of history, or to a misleading 
analogy, deeply rooted in "Western" 
thought, between change in societies 
and "development" in living organisms. 
For example: 
• "A fair amount of effort has been 
given to attempts at definition as 
well as to the argument that develop-
ment 'in general' or 'as such' is a 
proper or sufficient goal of national 
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and international activity. But it is 
insufficiently pondered how strange 
and remarkable is our use of the 
term. We proceed as though 'every-
one knows' what it means. And, to be 
sure, at a common-sense level 
everyone does. . . . The common-
sense meaning is clear: to be develop-
ed is to be Western. Or, if this seems 
ethnocentric, offensive, 'modern'. 
. . . The defining characteristics of 
modernity in the West have not been 
achieved by an effort, consciously 
and nominally, 'to develop'. This 
is a post-hoc rationalization, a 
convenient fiction to give history 
'meaning'. . . . We do not know, 
with anything approaching complete-
ness and certainty, how to make a 
pre-modern State modern. . . . Even 
if we had such knowledge, it would 
not solve the problem of development 
if this is conceived as achievement 
of a certain set of now-known, defining 
characteristics which, if achieved, 
would make all nations 'developed'. 
For the most highly developed 
nations are in a period of rapid 
transformation. . . . When developing 
countries seek to become developed 
through the use of administrative 
means currently favoured in indus-
trialized countries, they will, if 
successful, be re-creating 'vanished 
civilizations'. . . . The present enthusi-
asm for development is a wondrous 
thing: everyone is for it, but what it 
is — other than a transient pattern — 
is open-ended, baffling" . 
Dwight Waldo, "Reflexions on Public 
Administration and National Development", 
International Social Science Journal, xxi, 2, 
1969. 
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• "The more concrete, empirical, and 
behavioural our subject matter, the 
less the applicability to it of the 
theory of development and its several 
conceptual elements. It is tempting 
enough to apply these elements to 
the constructed entities which abound 
in Western social thought: to civili-
zation as a whole, to mankind, to total 
society; to such entities as capitalism, 
democracy, and culture. . . . Having 
endowed one or other of these with 
life through the familiar process of 
reification, it is but a short step to 
further endowment with growth. . . .It 
is something else entirely, however, 
when we try, as much social theory 
at present is trying, to impose these 
concepts of developmentalism upon, 
not constructed entities but the kind 
of subject matter that has become 
basic in the social sciences today: 
the social behaviour of human beings 
in specific areas and within finite 
limits of time. ... The model of 
Western Europe and its seeming 
direction of social change during 
the past half-dozen centuries... 
is made the trend of social change 
for all human civilization and, as 
countless studies of the so-called 
modernizing nations suggest, the 
stereotype for their individual 
analysis — and also their recons-
truction" . 
The dismissal of "development" as 
an updated version of the "Western" 
myth of progress naturally cannot 
^Robert A. Nesbit, Social Change and 
History: Aspects of the Western Theory of 
Development (London, Oxford University Press, 
1969). 
satisfy political leaders and ideologists 
who start from the premise that the 
present situation and future prospects 
of their societies are unacceptable, 
however congenial they may find the 
discrediting of "Western" models. 
Rational action based on a valid 
interpretation of the society in question 
and aimed at a preferable future must 
be possible. If "development" as 
previously conceived is unattainable, 
undesirable, or meaningless for the 
society, then "true" development must 
mean something else. "Development" 
becomes a path to be chosen by each 
national society on the basis of its values 
rather than a mould to be imposed on 
it. The undercurrents of voluntarism 
in developmental discourse continually 
reappear in differing forms in response 
to political demands. Several related 
questions then come to the fore: Can 
"development" mean anything anyone 
wants it to mean? Do all of the national 
societies now on the world stage have the 
capacity as well as the right to "develop"? 
Can a society or agents acting in the 
name of a society choose images of the 
future different from those hitherto 
current, unconstrained by the society's 
past and present, and convert these 
images into reality through rational 
action? Under what conditions? If it 
is granted that development can and 
should mean different things for 
different societies and that the attain-
ment of viable and acceptable national 
style of development4 depends as much 
4See Report on a Unified Approach to 
Development Analysis and Planning, Prelimi-
nary Report of the Secretary-Genera¡ (E/CN.5/ 
477, 25 October 1972) which distinguishes 
between the "real style of development" of a 
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on political will as on economic and 
cultural preconditions, what is the 
relevance of international prescriptions 
laying down what "development" should 
be? 
In the International Development 
Strategy adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1970 and in numerous 
other declarations within the framework 
of the United Nations, Governments 
have agreed on Utopian-normative 
standards for development that have 
not been met convincingly anywhere 
in the world and have called for studies 
demonstrating how to bring development 
processes into closer correspondence 
with these standards. The international 
declarations juxtapose and try to 
reconcile propositions deriving from 
quite different conceptions of develop-
ment. The most authoritative and 
coherent formulation — in paragraph 
18 of the International Development 
Strategy — contains at least three 
national society (that is, what is actually hap-
pening, on the supposition that no society is 
static), and "preferred styles" (that is, what 
certain forces in the society want to happen). 
It is assumed that several preferred styles will 
normally be competing for attention within a 
given society and that overt preferences can mask 
quite different real preferences. In the present 
paper, the term "prevailing style" is used as 
equivalent to "real style", and refers to the 
variants of dependent capitalism prevailing in 
most of Latin America. The terms "original", 
and "value-oriented" refer to preferred styles 
that correspond to the criteria for styles combin-
ing "acceptability" and "viability" set forth in 
the "unified approach" report. "Styles of 
development" emanate from social systems, as 
conceptualizations of their processes of growth 
and change, and may or may not give rise to 
explicit strategies. 
separable propositions : (i) that "the 
ultimate purpose of development is to 
provide increasing opportunities to 
all people for a better life"; (ii) that 
the more specific objectives associated 
with this purpose (rapid growth, 
structural change, more equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, 
expansion of social services, safeguar-
ding of the environment) are "parts of 
the same dynamic process", simul-
taneously ends and means; (iii) that 
it is feasible as well as desirable to move 
toward all objectives at the same time 
and in a "unified" way. The Strategy 
spells out the social objectives that are 
to be unified in a formidable list of 
commitments expressed in general 
terms; elsewhere it concentrates on the 
more traditional economic objective of 
a rate of growth in production of at 
least 6 per cent annually and (in 
relatively precise terms) on the economic 
requisites for attainment of this objective. 
The above propositions are compa-
tible with one another, but endorsement 
of any one of them does not require 
acceptance of all the others. The social 
objectives remain vulnerable to 
arguments that accomplishment of the 
"ultimate" purpose of development 
requires immediate concentration on 
rapid growth, that no society is capable 
of "unified" pursuit of all the other 
objectives set forth in the Strategy, and 
that governmental attempts to do so 
within existing political systems and 
resource limitations will simply paralyze 
the capacity — insufficient at best — 
to accelerate economic growth. The 
economic target, for its part, is equally 
vulnerable to arguments that policy 
concentration on very high rates of 
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economic growth unavoidably exacerbates 
societal tensions, heightens maldistribu-
tion of wealth and power, and distorts 
life styles in ways that will make the 
"ultimate purpose" ever harder to 
approach. 
It is probable that international 
discourse concerning development will 
continue to vacillate between conceptions 
of development subject to the economic 
Kingdom of Necessity (however this 
may be envisaged) and conceptions of 
development as at least potentially a 
variable embodiment of societal values 
and choices . Experiences up to the 
present strengthen the negative sides 
of both the arguments summarized 
above:,the real processes of "development" 
are not incontrovertibly enhancing 
human welfare even in the high-income 
countries and their long-term viability 
is in doubt, while the attempts to 
formulate and apply original, auto-
nomous, human-oriented styles of 
development continue to founder in their 
confrontations with reality or to survive 
at a price that leaves their promise 
unfulfilled. 
The present paper will explore the 
value-oriented propositions in the more 
recent international declarations as 
elements for a coherent reconcept uali-
zation of development and for the 
definition of original styles of develop-
Questions of this kind, of course, were 
debated in Latin America as well as other parts 
of the world long before the term "development" 
became current. Most of the present arguments 
were paralleled in Mexico, in particular, prior 
to and during the Revolution. See Arnaldo 
Cordova, La ideología de la revolución mexicana: 
Formación del nuevo régimen (Mexico, D.F., 
Ediciones Era, 1973). 
ment compatible with real national 
situations within the real world order. 
It will confront the elements with the 
central suppositions of development 
theories up to the present; with the 
characteristics of the world economic 
and political order; with the position 
of Latin America within this order; and 
with the different types of national 
societies and life-styles now emerging in 
Latin America. The exploration will 
treat conceptions, aspirations and 
societal images as capable of exerting 
real influence on what happens and as 
not entirely predetermined by economic 
laws or class interests, but it will avoid 
reifying them, or treating "develop-
ment" as an ideal reality existing apart 
from what societies actually do, and to 
which they can approximate to the extent 
that they broaden their understanding 
of what it "really" is. The paper assumes 
that present international demands for 
a "unified approach to development", 
for "autonomous and original styles of 
development", etc., derive from a 
justified rejection of present trends and 
prospects, and present a challenge to 
all would-be analysts and agents of 
development that should not be ignored 
or evaded. It also assumes that the 
expressions of this challenge are suscep-
tible to over-generalization, evasion of 
the more formidable difficulties, content-
ment with ritualistic reiteration of good 
intentions, and delusions that infallible 
and painless solutions to all problems are 
somewhere waiting to be discovered. 
These shortcomings are associated with 
the extremely varied and partly incom-
patible pressures and preoccupations 
that impinge on the demands for norma-
tive approaches to the problems of 
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development, and that can be reconciled, 
at the level of international discourse, 
only through eclectic compromise 
formulas. The main pressures and 
preoccupations can be set forth as 
follows: 
(a) Since the beginning of international 
concern over development, certain 
currents of opinion have concentrated 
on the formulation of ever more inclusive 
formulations of human rights, including 
rights to defined levels of living and 
social services. The proponents of 
human rights have dealt in absolutes: 
rights are the same everywhere and 
should be enforceable immediately, 
whatever the specific circumstances of 
the society. It follows that only one style 
of development is acceptable — and 
that must be a style very different from 
any of those prevailing. The standards 
for rights have derived mainly from 
the high-income industrialized countries, 
in which it can be assumed that material 
capacity for honouring of the rights 
is present, and in which strong political 
movements and pressure groups demand 
that they be honoured. In most of the 
rest of the world neither of these 
conditions has been present. Govern-
mental endorsement of rights requiring 
the commitment of important resources 
(e.g., universal education) has served 
partly as a symbolic substitute for 
action or promise of future action, and 
partly as a basis for demands on the 
high-income countries that they help 
finance observance of the rights they 
have endorsed. Development analysts 
and planners, for the most part, have 
treated the "rights" as non-binding 
expressions of good intentions, even 
when, within their own production-
oriented conceptions of development, 
they have given high priority to 
improvement of education, nutrition 
and public health. Within national 
societies arguments based on "rights" 
that are universal in principle become 
weapons of different classes or groups 
to strengthen their claims to a larger 
share of public resources that cannot 
be stretched thin enough to satisfy 
all the claims. The State confronts an 
incessant clamour from interest-groups 
and localities demanding that it "solve 
their problems" as a matter of right. 
Meanwhile, movements centring in the 
high-income countries continue to 
generate and obtain international 
approval for new formulations of rights, 
particularly in regard to public social 
services. The continuing confrontation 
of real development processes with 
"rights" that stand for international 
consensus on the content of a just 
social order is indispensable to the 
rethinking of development. However, 
permanent tension is to be expected 
between the universalistic pretensions 
of the rights formulations (with their 
derivation from certain types of 
societies and historical processes) and 
the quest for autonomous and vi able 
styles of development under conditions 
in which no conceivable agents of 
development will be able to "take into 
account" all the desiderata that are 
thrust upon them. 
(b) The high-income industrialized 
societies, in both the "capitalist" and the 
"socialist" variants, have encountered 
multiple crises — of values, of resources, 
of capacity of their dominant forces 
to accomplish their declared aims, of 
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capacity to maintain high levels of 
employment and consumption except 
at the price of inflation and environ-
mental degradation — that have shaken 
their self-confidence and partly discredi-
ted them as models for "development", 
"modernization", or the "welfare state". 
Their advances in planning, information 
systems and social science research have 
not saved them from drifting to the brink 
of such crises, then taking action in 
an atmosphere of improvisation and 
catastrophist publicity. The question 
comes to the fore whether they are not 
as much in need of a rethinking of 
development as the rest of the world, 
and even more inhibited in making the 
needed changes by the expectations 
and institutional rigidities that derive 
from their past successes. In the present 
context, it is worth emphasizing that 
their special preoccupations project 
themselves into the discussion of new 
styles of development for the rest of the 
world through the dominance of their 
academic and cultural institutions, and 
through the extent to which their shifts 
in resource use, consumption patterns, 
environmental standards, etc., affect 
what can actually be done elsewhere. 
The problems of "post-indu striai" or 
"post-modern" societies unavoidably 
become intertwined in the developmental 
thinking of societies that have experi-
enced the process of "industrialization" 
and "modernization" only in partial 
and distorted forms. 
(c) The "developing" countries that 
have attained high rates of economic 
growth and "modernization" have not 
been able to convert these processes into 
generalized enhancement of welfare 
and societal participation. The dominant 
forces in some of them remain convinced 
that they will eventually be able to do 
so and that there is no other practicable 
path to the " provision of increasing 
opportunities to all people for a better 
life"; consequently, they feel that the 
discussion of different styles of develop-
ment is dangerous nonsense. Their 
critics argue that their present patterns 
of growth and modernization are 
accompanied by increasing tensions 
that cannot be repressed or managed 
indefinitely, and point to certain 
countries previously held up as 
developmental good examples for their 
high rates of economic growth that have 
since undergone economic and political 
disasters. There is no way of proving 
that either thesis is universally sound, 
but at best the path of rapid, concen 
trated economic growth seems open only 
to a minority among the developing 
countries, and for this minority its 
desirability and long-term viability 
seem less self-evident than a few years 
ago. 
(d) The number of formally independent 
national units now on the world stage is 
much larger than at any time since the 
rise of the "modern" nation-state. Many 
of them are so lacking in what have 
been considered the basic preconditions 
for development, or even the basic 
preconditions for "national" indepen-
dence, that they can only despair of 
matching up to the conventional 
development prescriptions. If they are 
not to resign themselves to permanent 
dependence on international aid 
combined with the proceeds of raw 
material exports (which may be real 
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possibilities for some but not for others), 
they must seek original paths to the 
future. They may rely on solidarity 
with societies in a like position, 
subordinating their "national" autonomy 
to the formation of units large enough 
to se economically and politically viable, 
or they may move toward a closed, 
austere, equalitarian national life-style, 
excluding stimuli toward consumption 
levels they cannot attain. In either 
case, or in trying to combine the two 
strategies, their political leaders and 
ideologists find no dependable pre-
cedents or prescriptions for what they 
are trying to do. 
(e) Both the rich and the poor societies 
have awakened quite suddenly to the 
implications of present levels and 
geographical distribution of natural 
resources, as they interact with popu-
lation and consumption growth trends. 
It is obvious, once the problem is stated, 
that the societies representing the 
overwhelming majority of the world's 
population will never be able to attain 
levels of per capita resource use 
remotely similar to those already 
attained by a few high-income societies 
in North America and in Europe. It 
is doubtful whether the latter societies 
will be able to maintain their present 
levels and patterns of resource use for 
much longer. For most of the world a 
viable style of development must 
envisage relatively modest levels of 
consumption of non-renewable resources, 
substitution of renewable for non-
renewable resources wherever feasible, 
and adequate ecological controls to 
ensure that the latter really are 
"renewable". The probability emerges 
that the low-income countries will 
gradually shift from maximizing 
exports of their non-renewable resources 
to husbanding these resources for their 
own use, in the face of increasingly 
desperate demands for them from the 
high-income countries. Paradoxically, 
the prospect also emerges that the 
low-income predominantly rural-agricul-
tural countries will become increasingly 
dependent for food supplies on the high-
income predominantly urban-industrial 
countries at a time when food production 
surpluses in the latter are vanishing. 
(f) The conventional international ap-
proaches have assumed that "countries" 
develop and that development is closely 
associated with processes labelled 
"modernization" and "nation-building". 
It has been postulated that planned 
action at the national level to further 
these processes is both feasible and 
essential, that countries should depend 
on mobilization of internal resources as 
far as possible, but that they can 
rightfully and realistically demand 
financial and technical "co-operation" 
from the high-income "developed" 
countries. Enormous and labyrinthically 
complex international machinery has 
come into being on the basis of these 
suppositions. Factors such as those 
mentioned above, along with certain 
traits of the international co-operation 
machinery itself — the dubious applica-
bility of many of the technical transfers, 
the failure of "planning" to respond to 
the hopes invested in it, the crippling 
indebtedness that has resulted from the 
conditions of financial transfers, etc. —-
have brought the basic suppositions 
into question. Experience has given 
increased plausibility to an alternative 
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viewpoint that has been argued (in 
several differing versions) since the 
beginning of the international develop-
ment effort: that autonomous develop-
ment at the national level is an illusion 
within the present world order, that the 
reality is an international market 
system that generates "development" 
(by the conventional economic criterion) 
at one pole and "underdevelopment" or 
"dependent development" (in the more 
qualified versions) at the other, within 
which imitative modernization simply 
internalizes the patterns of dependence 
and "nation-building" can be no more 
than a façade. Under such interpre-
tations, the phenomenon is not simply 
one of exploitation of poor "countries" 
by rich "countries". The processes of 
polarization are not delimited by 
national frontiers, since "modernizing" 
interests in all countries identify 
themselves with the dominant centres 
and benefit from the system at the 
expense of the rest of the population. 
It follows that the rich countries are 
inherently incapable of helping others 
to "develop", as long as both adhere to 
the market order. Some versions go 
farther and question whether relations 
between "socialist" non-market societies 
of the centre and the periphery could 
overcome polarization and dependency 
as long as prevailing tactics of moderni-
zation and technological transfers are 
perpetuated. International techn ical 
and financial co-operation, then, un-
avoidably conforms to the traits of the 
dominant world order. It necessarily 
strengthens the ties of dependency and 
helps the dominant forces in the 
dependent societies evade the choices 
and sacrifices required for "authentic" 
development, whether or not it brings 
them short-term advantages. Since the 
 international co-operation movement 
 represents a major intellectual and 
emotional investment as well as a source 
of livelihood for thousands of persons 
skilled in manipulating developmental 
symbols, and since there are very few 
societies where the dominant forces are 
prepared to renounce altogether the 
hopes and material advantages it has 
offered, however disillusioned they may 
be with it, its present crisis contributes 
another current to the quest for new 
conceptions of development. Like develop-
- ment itself, if international co-operation 
is judged futile or deceptive in the forms 
it has taken then it must mean something 
else. 
The above pressures and preoc-
cupations, taken together, suggest that 
the international debate over the 
meaning of "development" (or some 
other term designating hopes for a 
better future, if the term "development" 
falls into discredit) and the tension 
between determinist and voluntarist-
normative views, between universalist 
views and culturally specific views, and 
between revolutionary-catastrophist views 
and evolutionary-linear-progress views 
will continue for the foreseeable future. 
The international impingement of 
basically incompatible viewpoints will 
continue to generate eclectic, compromise 
formulations of ends and means. 
Each "country" by the fact of its 
formal independence has a recognized 
right to determine its own ends and 
means, but it cannot expect to do so 
with impunity if it defies the real 
constraints imposed by the international 
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order and its own endowment of human 
and other resources. It should not 
expect to do so with impunity if it 
disregards the values of social justice, 
human welfare, participation and 
freedom on which the international 
community has reached a consensus. 
But are the "countries" real entities 
capable of making choices and claiming 
rights ? Who speaks for them ? Is 
"development", however conceived, really 
uppermost in the purposes of the spokes-
men and of the masses of their popu-
lations? 
If the quest for original styles of 
development oriented towards the 
"ultimate purpose" set forth in the 
International Development Strategy 
is to be more than a Utopian exercise, 
it must not only seek to demonstrate 
the viability and desirability of such 
styles, but must identify potential 
agents of them and propose strategies 
in terms intelligible to these agents. In 
international discourse, this is the 
aspect most likely to be evaded. 
Statements are either couched in the 
passive voice, or use the term "we" 
in a manner that suggests that their 
authors are certified spokesmen for 
public opinion in the societies striving 
to develop. One of the most explicit 
formulations in an international docu-
ment up to the present affirms that: 
"To achieve the desired objective, more 
radical measures... have to be adopted. 
Whether they are feasible or not depends 
heavily on the balance of political forces 
in the country concerned. . . . Unless 
there is sufficient political commitment 
to the surmounting of these constraints, 
efforts to combat poverty are destined 
to fail"6. 
Formulations of this kind implicitly 
challenge the realism of most normative 
declarations. It is one thing to suppose 
that a well-meaning government is 
unaware of the things it ought to be 
doing, and quite another to suppose 
that it may be uninterested in or 
incapable of doing these things even 
after exhortation or scolding. If the 
"balance of political forces" is such 
that a government cannot apply the 
"radical measures" required for a 
value-oriented development strategy, 
what follows? One can fall back on 
warnings of dire consequences if the 
advice is not followed, as does the Com-
mittee for Development Planning 
document quoted above: "In mustering 
the political will and in organizing the 
required national consensus... Govern-
ments need to recognize that failing 
to act — or making no more than token 
responses to mass poverty and un-
employment problems — is likely to 
•7 
yield even more disruptive outcomes" . 
6Committee for Development Planning, 
Attack on Mass Poverty and Unemployment 
(United Nations Publication, Sales N°: E. 72. 
ll.A.ll). 
The same point of view is expressed with 
particular clarity in an address delivered by Mr. 
Robert S. Me Ñamara to the annual meeting of 
the Board of Governors of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(Summary Proceedings, Washington, D.C., 25 
September 1972): "Governments exist to 
promote the welfare of all of their citizens — not 
just that of a privileged few ... absolute human 
degradation — when it reaches the proportions 
of 30 to 40 per cent of an entire citizenry — 
cannot be ignored, cannot be suppressed, and 
cannot be tolerated for too long a time by any 
government hoping to preserve civil order". 
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These warnings have not proved convin-
cing in the face of historical evidence 
that the deliberate organization of 
radical structural changes in societies 
is a path with unpredictable consequences 
for the leaders and social forces entering 
upon it, and that if the values and 
perceived immediate interests of the 
forces controlling the State do not 
require such changes, it is safer and 
cheaper for them to allocate resources 
to an effective repressive apparatus. 
In some respects, the constraints 
set by the dominant world order now 
"To underprice capital for the wealthy and make 
credit expensive for the poor; to allow liberal 
access to scarce resources for the privileged, 
and price them out of reach of the deprived; 
to provide subsidies for the powerful, and deny 
them to the powerless — these are wholly self-
defeating approaches to development. Such 
policies lead a nation inevitably toward economic 
imbalance and social instability." The "power-
ful" and the "privileged" might answer that 
the State exists precisely to look after their 
welfare, that there is no infallible way of 
guaranteeing economic balance and social 
stability, but that they have in mind ways that 
are more likely to work for them than those 
demanded by Mr. McNamara ... or they might 
see fit to agree with him publicly and follow 
their own counsel privately. A remark by Dudley 
Seers is apposite: "A familiar joke in the 
international scene today is the attempt by the 
'progressive' economist, domestic or foreign, 
to sell land reform or industrialization, or more 
effective tax collection, or wider educational 
opportunity, or greater independence from a 
foreign power to a government whose raison 
d'etre is precisely the prevention of such 
developments, or at least limiting them to the 
greatest extent possible". ("The Prevalence 
of Pseudo-Planning", in Mike Faber and Dudley 
Seers, Ed. The Crisis in Planning {Chatto and 
Windus for Sussex University Press, London, 
1972).} 
seem less rigid than they did a few years 
ago. At least, the present multifaceted 
crisis is changing their character in ways 
that make their future problematic. 
Nevertheless, certain elements in the 
world order remain so pervasive that 
no country can embark on a develop-
mental path radically incompatible 
with them without the certainty of 
enormous difficulties and sacrifices. 
The dominant life-styles and consump-
tion aspirations may prove even harder 
to change than the centre-periphery 
patterns of political, financial, trade, 
and technological dependency to which 
so much attention has been devoted. 
Prescriptions such as that advanced 
by the Development Planning Com-
mittee for the elimination of mass 
poverty and unemployment may be 
viable only at the price of protracted 
social struggles with unpredictable 
results, involving the emergence of an 
entirely new power structure. Under 
other circumstances, the quest for 
value-oriented autonomous styles of 
development may make real policies 
even more confused and self-contradic-
tory than hitherto, and may terminate 
in disaster for regimes embarking on 
the quest without the will or the 
capacity to handle the consequences. 
Value-oriented styles of development 
will require not only agents capable 
of setting the society in motion in the 
desired direction and mobilizing 
popular participation and support. 
They must also meet minimum 
performance standards in terms of 
resource mobilization and allocation, 
production and distribution of goods 
and services, enforcement of priorities, 
etc., without generating unmanageable 
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societal resistance. The circumstances 
under which such styles become 
politically possible also ensure consider-
able inefficiency and cross-purposes 
during a transitional period of learning 
by experience. There is no reason to' 
expect existing interest-groups to take 
the virtues of the new styles for granted, 
and real shortcomings are bound to 
reinforce their skepticism or hostility. 
The proponents of a new style will be 
under continual temptation to fall 
back on propaganda, intolerance of 
criticism, exaggeration of achievements 
and concealment of mistakes, if they 
have a monopoly of power, and on 
compromises whose costs make the 
original objectives unattainable, if they 
do not. 
If one assumes that nation-states 
will continue to be the basic framework 
within which processes identifiable as 
"development" will be attempted and 
will succeed or fail, the final question 
is whether and under what conditions 
social forces will become dominant that 
will make the required choices, accept 
the required sacrifices, and hold to the 
thread of rational purpose. 
2. ¿at* 
The setting within which developmental 
choices present themselves 
(a) Central elements in the international consensus on value-
oriented development 
The most comprehensively normative-
Utopian among the many international 
formulations of criteria for development 
is the Declaration on Social Progress 
and Development approved by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 
1969 as resolution 2542 (XXIV). The 
Declaration proposes, in considerable 
detail, the "elimination" of all the ills 
that afflict mankind and the provision 
of all the services that any sector of 
mankind might require, within a setting 
of freedom, equal rights, and participa-
tion of "all members of society". This 
Declaration is the culmination of a 
series of attempts to define "social 
development" as a reality separate from 
"economic development" and hospitably 
includes such a wide range of the mean-
ings that specialists in the different 
sectors of public social action have 
attached to the term that it is of little 
help towards distinguishing the central 
elements in the international consensus. 
The unanimous approval of such a 
sweeping text, which if taken literally 
would call for transformation of the 
practices and priorities of all the 
organized societies of the world, and 
the minimal attention that has been 
paid to it since, even in the secretariats 
of the international agencies, are 
worthy of note. 
The pursuit of universalist "social" 
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standards for development could hardly 
go farther. Since then international 
efforts have taken a somewhat different 
direction, also foreshadowed in various 
earlier initiatives: towards the definition 
of a "unified approach" to development, 
conceived as a societal process in which 
"economic" means cannot be satisfactorily 
separated from "social" ends, and in 
which the meaning of what is done 
depends on the characteristics of the 
society in which it is done and the 
overall purposes of the dominant forces 
in the society. 
The International Development 
Strategy mentioned above states that : 
"...qualitative and structural changes 
in the society must go hand in hand 
with rapid economic growth, and existing 
disparities — regional, sectoral and 
social — should be substantially reduced. 
These objectives are both determining 
factors and end-results of development; 
they should therefore be viewed as 
integrated parts of the same dynamic 
process, and would require a unified 
approach". Another General Assembly 
resolution of the same year — 2681 
(xxv): Unified approach to economic 
and social planning in national develop-
ment — specifies "the need to include 
in such an approach components which 
are designed: (a) To leave no section of 
the population outside the scope of 
change and development, (b) To effect 
structural change which favours national 
development and to activate all sectors 
of the population to participate in the 
development process, (c) To aim at 
social equity, including the achievement 
of an equitable distribution of income 
and wealth in the nation...". It hedges 
these general prescriptions by a clause 
to the effect they "should be borne in 
mind in development analysis and 
planning processes . . . according to the 
particular developmental needs of each 
country". 
Most recently, the fifteenth session 
of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America in 1973 adopted as resolution 
320 (xv) the "Quito Appraisal" of 
the International Development Strategy, 
which goes some distance farther in 
stating criteria for "integrated develop-
ment" or "human development". Such 
development, according to the Quito 
Appraisal : 
— Aims at a "new type of society", or 
"a social system that gives priority to 
the equality and dignity of man and 
respects and fosters the cultural 
expression of the population". "Social 
participation in all forms of the develop-
ment process must be increased in order 
to achieve ajuster society". 
— Is incompatible with "traditional" 
social and economic structures and 
requires "qualitative and structural 
changes". The Appraisal does not 
define the "traditional" structures, but 
states that the needed changes "include 
the control and sovereign utilization 
of natural resources, the reform of land 
tenure systems..., the establishment 
of such forms of public or mixed owner-
ship of property as each country may 
consider appropriate..., and any other 
type of substantive reform needed to 
secure that objective". 
— "Cannot be achieved through 
partial efforts in particular sectors of 
the economy or the social system, but 
only through concerted progress in all 
aspects." "The very concept of develop-
ment must be improved and the 
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fragmentary approach to economic 
growth and human development discar-
ded . . . it is necessary to take an 
integrated view of all the social, economic 
and political determinants." 
— Should not be identified with 
economic growth, which "has frequently 
failed to bring with it qualitative changes 
of equal importance in human wellbeing 
and social justice" and has coincided 
with "the continued existence of serious 
problems such as mass poverty, the 
incapacity of the system of production 
to provide employment for the growing 
labour force, and the lack of economic 
and social participation of broad strata 
of the population". However, "acelerat-
ed, harmonious and independent 
growth is essential to the success of 
these qualitative and structural changes". 
— Should be self-sustaining and 
independent at the national level. 
However, when "a country simultaneously 
tackles all aspects of development and 
promotes the structural reforms needed 
to achieve integrated development, 
experience indicates that imbalances 
occur in the initial stages which make it 
difficult to continue the process. The 
social injustices and tensions which have 
accumulated over the years manifest 
themselves in demands which domestic 
resources cannot meet. In order to 
correct these imbalances, the inter-
national co-operation received by such 
a country should not be subject to 
restrictions...". 
The Appraisal assumes that en-
dorsement of the above criteria for 
"integrated development" by the Latin 
American countries is compatible with 
"a high degree of heterogeneity in their 
economies and societies" and also with 
"different approaches to the develop-
ment process, with each model having 
different options or methods of 
implementation", and with the pursuit 
of "medium and long-term policies... 
whose basic principles, both political 
and economic, differ substantially. 
Hence, there is no single model to 
which the appraisal can refer". 
Taken together, the above criteria 
and suppositions constitute elements 
for a conception of development that is 
both value-oriented and "structural", 
but compatible with diverse combinations 
of ends and means. They call implicitly 
for a considerable amplification of action 
by the State, informed and given 
coherence by values and the pursuit of 
structural change. They assume that 
such action is compatible with the 
character of the internal social forces 
controlling the State. They assume 
that full "participation" by all strata 
of the population is not merely compat-
ible with "integrated development" 
oriented by the State, but is an essential 
component of such development. 
The Appraisal states that "the 
developing countries have adopted 
internal policies and made efforts to 
attain the goals and objectives stipulat-
ed" in the International Development 
Strategy. However, "imbalances", "ten 
sions", and "demands which domestic 
resources cannot meet" have endangered 
or frustrated the efforts of the countries 
embarking on structural changes, this 
indicating a contradiction between the 
ideal of integrated policy and the ideal 
of full participation. The Appraisal 
indicates that up to the present the 
role of the international order has on 
the whole been negative: "the necessary 
APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT: WHO IS APPROACHING WHAT? / Marshall Wotfe US 
co-operation has not been forthcoming 
from the developed countries to comp-
lement (internal) efforts"; "countries 
undertaking structural changes in con-
formity with the IDS sometimes have to 
face hostility and economic agression 
from abroad". Nevertheless, the Ap-
praisal falls back on future international 
co-operation, governed by a "dynamic 
set of rules", to be achieved through 
united action of the developing countries, 
to resolve the contradictions between 
integrated policy aimed at structural 
change, limited resources, and the need 
for broader participation, or at least 
reduce to manageable proportions. 
The criteria for integrated develop-
ment advanced by the Quito Appraisal 
are more focussed and coherent as well 
as more flexible than those of earlier 
international declarations; they rep-
resent a clear advance over the con-
ceptions of "economic development" as 
a process with its own inexorable laws 
and requirements, to be somehow tamed 
and humanized by "social development" 
governed by detailed universal norms 
derived from the social legislation and 
As was indicated above, the interminable 
international discussions on development 
during the past three decades never 
arrived at clear agreement on the 
meaning of development and how to 
attain it, but in spite of the continual 
confrontation of propositions deriving 
from Marx and from Keynes and of 
practices ranging between the extremes 
of "central planning" based on State 
services of high-income countries. In-
evitably, considering the circumstances 
of its adoption, while the Appraisal 
calls for far-reaching changes in the role 
of the State and of national social 
forces, in the international order of 
relations between States, and in the 
relations between economic processes 
and human purposes, it does not face 
up to the questions of basic compatibility 
with the national and international order 
and of the capacities of these orders 
for self-ti ansformation. It is open to 
the criticism that it requires a deus ex 
machina at the national level to bring 
order out of the clash of purposes and 
strategies of different groups and the 
complex repercussions, not necessarily 
wanted or intended by any group, of the 
economic, social, political, and demo-
graphic processes that are now working 
themselves out in each national society, 
plus another deus ex machina at the 
international level to meet the needs 
that cannot be met nationally, or that 
can be met only at a price — in terms 
of privations and compulsion 
incompatible with the criteria. 
ownership of the means of production 
and "market economies" restricting 
State intervention to a minimum of 
regulation and infrastructural invest-
ment, a partially explicit international 
consensus emerged on the requirements 
of "development" for societies labelled 
"underdeveloped" or "developing" or 
simply "poor". It is these requirements 
that are now coming under question, in 
(b) Central elements in the previous international consensus on 
"development" as aprocess with uniform requirements 
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regard to their feasibility or their desir-
ability or their meaningfulness, although 
even the most radical challenges can 
hardly reject them wholesale, or evade 
their central premise on the indispensa-
bility of much higher levels of productive 
capacity, 
They can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Accumulation. Development sup-
poses high rates of capital investment so 
as to increase future capacity for 
production of goods and services. For 
most national societies, accumulation 
must come mainly from domestic 
resources ; main reliance for their 
mobilization and allocation may be 
placed either on the State or on indivi-
duals responding to economic incentives. 
(ii) Industrialization. No country can 
attain "development" as long as it 
remains predominantly rural-agricultural, 
although export-oriented agriculture may 
support considerable increases in per 
capita income and make accumulation 
possible. The literature often uses "in-
dustrialized" as a synonym for "develop-
ed". 
(Hi) Agricultural modernization. "Tradi-
tional" systems of land ownership and 
rural social relationships are associated 
with low productivity, immobilization of 
human resources, unresponsiveness to 
market incentives. According to different 
conceptions the changes may be limited 
to modernization of incentives and 
productive techniques, or may involve 
revolutionary changes in property and 
power. 
(iv) Standardization of consumer de-
mands. With many variations and qua-
lifications it h as been assumed that 
development requires the bringing of 
continually wider strata, and eventually 
the whole population, into a national 
market for consumer goods, in which 
the rewards of sacrifice in the early stages 
of accumulation will be increasing 
capacity to acquire a wider range of 
industrially-produced goods, with rising 
production and consumption continually 
stimulating each other. The culmination 
of development is then mass private 
ownership of automobiles, television 
receivers, and electrical appliances. 
(v) Entrepreneurship. Development re-
quires special kinds of responsiveness 
to economic incentives, capacity to 
organize large-scale production, in-
novate, and take risks. This function, 
according to different conceptions, may 
best be carried out by private entre-
preneurs seeking profit, by managers 
acting on behalf of the State and 
compensated by power or pride in 
contributions to the good of society, or 
by a combination of the two. 
(vi) Technological and scientific dif 
fusion. Development requires continual 
technological innovation, based largely 
on scientific research. In view of the 
technological superiority of the rich 
countries over the poor and their vastly 
greater research capacities, the needs 
of the latter can be met mainly by 
selective borrowing. This requires 
"technical assistance" furnished by 
"experts" from the technologically 
advanced countries. 
(vii) Universal education. Development 
requires many kinds of specialized 
"human resources" and a population 
capable of grasping and responding 
to "modern" incentives. This requisite 
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can be , attained only through the 
universalization of primary education 
and the expansion of many kinds of 
secondary, technical and higher 
education, along lines for which the 
"developed" countries offer models. 
(viii) Provision of social services and 
social security. Modernization, urbaniz-
ation, and associated changes accompany-
ing development require a widening 
range of public services and protective 
mechanisms, in addition to education, 
to alleviate social tensions and enable 
individuals to function as "human 
resources", consumers and citizens. 
Views differ as to the priority to be 
given to such services and mechanisms, 
but even the most concentratedly 
economic conceptions of development 
admit their unavoidability. Once again, 
the "developed" countries offer models 
for the organization of social security, 
social welfare, public health, family 
planning, etc., that can be introduced 
and adapted to the extent that the 
stage of development permits. 
(ix) Continually expanding participation 
in world trade. Development requires a 
high level of imports to meet the 
demands of industrialization and 
agricultural modernization, and rising 
incomes mean a demand for consumer 
goods that cannot be satisfied from 
domestic production. Thus exports 
must continually rise to pay for imports, 
the prices of exports must not undergo 
pronounced slumps, and, ideally, exports 
of manufactures must gradually gain in 
importance relative to raw materials, 
although volume and prices of exports 
of the latter will continue to be of crucial 
importance. 
(x) Rising net financial flows from 
''developed" (rich) countries to "develop-
ing" (poor) countries. Only in excep-
tional circumstances can the preceding 
requirements be met through the un-
aided mobilization of internal resources 
and through foreign exchange derived 
from exports. The development of poor 
countries requires some combination of 
financial grants, low-interest loans, and 
direct investments coming from the rich 
countries, with the needed proportions 
depending on the initial situation and 
development strategy of the poor country. 
Different schools of thought have 
advanced many additional requirements 
for "development", ranging from the 
taking of power by a class capable of 
imposing determined modes of ac-
cumulation and production to the 
transformation of child-rearing practices 
in the family, as more basic than any 
of the above. Consensus on those listed. 
however, has been fairly general. Even 
the proponents of different priorities 
have had to argue, in order to get a 
hearing, that their proposals would 
contribute to the attainment of these 
requirements. It was accepted that the 
future world, to the extent that more 
and more national societies conformed 
to these requirements, would become 
more homogeneous, less conflict-ridden, 
and more capable of supporting 
satisfactory levels of welfare for most of 
its population. 
In the course of national and inter-
national efforts to meet the requirements, 
and as a result of unplanned social 
and economic processes pointing in the 
same direction, most human societies 
have changed enormously since the 
1940s. A different world order has 
emerged, in many respects more 
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interdependent, imposing more complex 
constraints on change in national 
societies than ever before. In other 
respects, paradoxically, the possibilities 
for autonomous voluntarist action, for 
better or worse, have widened, and also 
the possibilities for societal changes or 
breakdowns escaping from the control 
of any power centre, national or inter-
national. The deliberate political and 
economic constraints imposed by the 
world centres on the development of 
the periphery may be weakening, and 
the capacity of the centres to offer 
An interpretative description of the 
world economic and political order in 
its present state of flux, in which the 
events of each year confound the 
expectations of the preceding one, 
would be a risky undertaking and beyond 
the pretensions of the present discussion. 
The most that can be done is to single 
out certain features that seem particular-
ly relevant: 
(i) Continual changes in the dominant 
preocupations in the world centres are 
generating corresponding changes and 
increasing diversity in the forms of 
control, advice and co-operation through 
which the governments and interest-
groups of these centres try to deal with 
the peripheral societies. A certain loss 
of confidence in previous prescriptions, 
or even of interest in the very theme of 
aided development, in the main centres 
coincides with increasing sympathy and 
support in certain smaller high-income 
the periphery coherent and attractive 
models for change is weakening more 
incontrovertibly, but other constraints 
inherent in the partial and distorted 
attainment of the development require-
ments listed above are becoming more 
formidable. The next stage in the 
present exploration will be to try to 
 summarize certain central features of 
the world order that have emerged in 
the course of the struggle for develop-
ment, to which declarations such as the 
IDS and the Quito Appraisal are 
reacting, 
countries for original and autonomous 
styles of development elsewhere. A kind 
of vicarious utopianism has appeared 
which, although it may under-estimate 
:, or misjudge the real difficulties of 
value-oriented development in poor and 
dependent countries, does something 
; to widen the options open to them. At 
the same time, the "visibility" of more 
specific developmental problems is 
shifting and dominant currents of 
opinion in the world centres continu-
I ally urge, through the international 
organizations, new priorities on the 
i peripheral societies. The most conspi-
'•' cuous examples are the rise of world-
i wide campaigns, backed by significant 
: resources from the world centres, relating 
i, to "population" and the "environment". 
' Equitable income distribution and full 
; employment have similarly come to the 
I fore, although without a comparable 
: disposition in the world centres to 
(c) Characteristics of the present world order in relation to the 
conventionally-defined requirements of development and the possibility of 
autonomous national choices of styles and strategies 
APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT: WHO IS APPROACHING WHAT? / Marshall tVoffe 149 
allocate resources to their attainment. 
With increasingly coherent tactics, the 
spokesmen of the peripheral societies 
seek to adapt the campaigns and 
resource availabilities deriving from 
the changing visibility of problems to 
their own conceptions of needs, especially 
for more favourable terms of trade 
and aid. 
(ii) While the disproportion in per capita 
wealth and in power between the world 
centres and the periphery is certainly 
not diminishing the forms of dominance 
and dependency are changing and 
becoming in some respects ambivalent. 
The spread of industrialization and its 
increasing dominance by transnational 
corporations whose national affiliates 
are capable of self-financing transforms 
the previous patterns of exchange of raw 
materials for manufactured goods 
and renders obsolete the previous 
conceptions of "foreign investment". 
The latest technological innovations 
in the centres are increasingly remote 
from the needs and capacities of the 
peripheral societies, or possibly even 
from those of the centres (as in the case 
of supersonic transport) but the search 
for technological alternatives progresses 
very little. The low-income predominantly 
rural countries find themselves increasing-
ly dependent on the high-income 
urbanized countries for food supplies, 
but the latter countries rather suddenly 
find that their own life-styles, with their 
reliance on automotive transport and 
high consumption of electrical energy, 
have led them into a trap of dependence 
on peripheral societies as well as an 
environmental nightmare. Economic 
aggression has become a more diversified 
as well as a more menacing weapon 
than heretofore, and some of the 
peripheral societies are becoming able 
to use it as effectively as the centres. 
Both have the capacity of making 
"normal" functioning in other countries 
impossible by withholding supplies. 
(Hi) The processes of "development" 
or "modernization" in the peripheral 
countries, to the extent that they have 
taken place, and the rather compart 
mentalized economic and social 
programmes undertaken in their name, 
have invariably been characterized by 
polarization between groups able to 
"modernize" and benefit materially, 
and larger groups that do so only 
"marginally" or suffer absolute de-
privation. In one way or another all of 
the programmes counted on to enhance 
welfare and generalize development 
— from industrialization and agricul-
tural modernization to education, public 
health and social security — seem to 
contribute to this polarization, or 
"structural heterogeneity". Policies 
proposed specifically to improve the 
relative positions of the more marginal 
groups, such as community development, 
regional development, and agrarian 
reform, conform to the same pattern 
of polarized gains, or remain puny 
and impotent, or encounter structural 
resistance that destroys them. The 
problem is not simply that some parts 
of the national populations progress 
while others stagnate. The forms of 
"progress" impinge on the latter 
groups in ways that prevent them from 
"stagnating". The momentum of what 
has been done, the expectations of all 
social groups, and the differential 
access to power of the modernized groups 
make basic changes in the pattern of 
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polarized growth problematic, conflictive 
and costly, even if dominant political 
forces have a clear strategy for change, 
which is rarely the case. 
(iv) As polarization emerges more clearly 
as a key characteristic of "develop-
ing" societies, and to some extent even 
of societies previously identified as 
"developed", and as wider strata of 
the population "participate", at least 
to the extent of becoming conscious of 
the impact of change processes and 
seeking means of defending themselves, 
the compatibility of "development" and 
"participation" and the viability of 
democratic institutions and processes 
comes under question. Whether the aim 
is to maintain the prevailing polarized 
style of development — if it is judged 
the only viable style — or to transform 
it, authoritarian and technocratic 
solutions come to seem unavoidable. 
The national armed forces, preferably 
guided by social scientists and planners, 
are measured for the role of deus ex 
machina, whether they want it or not, 
and even by sectors of opinion with no 
stomach for authoritarian rule. In 
the minds of groups seeking means of 
implanting a preferred style of develop-
ment, it comes to seem more practicable 
to apply Disraeli's saying, "We must 
educate our masters", to the armed 
forces than to the people. Within the 
present world order, military leaders 
are trying to impose an extraordinarily 
wide range of styles of development in 
different countries, as a consequence of 
the failure of previous régimes to 
reconcile "development" and "partici-
pation". Such régimes present the 
likelihood of more coherent and original 
policy choices — sometimes to the point 
of arbitrariness — than the régi mes 
dependent on open political bargaining 
and compromise, but it remains to be 
seen whether such choices will be more 
consistently enforceable than the 
previous ones. Within the pattern of 
partial frustration of development, or 
unsatisfying "dependent development", 
the long-term trend may be cycl ical 
rather than consistently in the direction 
of military-authoritarian solutions: the 
failure of political compromise leads to 
military takeovers, but the inability of 
the military and their technocratic-
ideological advisers to cope with the 
complexity of the processes leads back 
to open political competition. 
(v) The identification of the "modern" 
sectors of the populations of the 
peripheral societies with the standards 
of their counterparts in the advanced 
societies becomes more complex and 
ambiguous as this identification clashes 
with the crises of standards in their 
countries of origin. Interest-groups or 
organizations (from chambers of com-
merce to trade unions), political parties, 
academic structures, transnational 
corporations, bureaucracies, brands of 
manufactured consumer goods, mass 
media content: all these experience 
world standardization and simultaneous 
reactions against standardization. The 
polarized peripheral societies import 
ideological "antibodies" along with the 
traits of the "affluent" societies and also 
develop their own antibodies that are 
re-exported to the high-income societies 
and enter into their cultural-political 
conflicts. In this sense, a world society 
is taking shape, characterized not by 
the harmonious incorporation of 
standardized high production and high 
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consumption previously looked to as 
a consequence of "development", but 
by a self-contradictory combination of 
increasing assimiliation of this pattern 
and increasing rejection of or frustration 
with it. In the peripheral societies the 
non-incorporation or marginalization 
of part of the population exacerbates 
For all the wide differences between 
Latin American countries, which will be 
discussed below, the region as a whole 
presents certain common features that 
differentiate it from the remainder of 
the so-called Third World and imply 
that its links with the world order are 
more complexly internalized, however 
precarious or unsatisfactory the resulting 
styles of development may be judged: 
(i) The dominant classes in Latin 
America have been culturally and 
economically identified with the"Western" 
or European order since the sixteenth 
century. The colonial experience is 
remote in time, and since the nineteenth 
century national elites have formulated 
strategies for national "progress" or 
"development", based on their own views 
of the relevance to their countries of 
the economic, social, and political 
doctrines current in the world centres. 
Their strategies have included the 
deliberate stimulation of national 
identification along European lines, 
the improvement of quantity and 
quality of population through im-
migration of Europeans, the expansion 
of educational systems modelled on 
those of the "advanced" countries, and 
the taking advantage of the international 
this contradictory process in two ways: 
by heightening the defensiveness of 
the "modernized" strata towards their 
privileged position, and by heightening 
the ideological rejection of dependent 
development. The two reactions can, of 
course, coexist conflictively in the same 
individual or the same policy formulation. 
division of labour through exports of 
raw materials. While these strategies 
have changed over time to incl ude 
industrialization, Latin American in-
tegration, etc., and while the favoured 
models among "advanced" countries 
have shifted, dependence of the elites 
on doctrines current in the world centres, 
combined with low valuation by the 
elites of the masses of the population 
as "human resources" for the kind of 
national advancement envisaged, has 
continued. Reactions of "indigenism", 
insistence on unique national paths to 
the creation of a new civilization, etc., 
have also been a recurrent theme since 
the nineteenth century but have lacked 
the support of vigorous non-European 
cultures and religions comparable to 
those of Asia and parts of Africa; they 
have exerted a significant influence on 
national development policies only in 
a few countries and for short periods. 
(ii) Urbanization, dependent moderni 
zation, industrialization, and elaboration 
of the bureaucratic machinery of the 
welfare state have reached a point at 
which sizeable minorities of the population 
in most countries and possibly a 
majority in one or two are fully 
identified with the life-styles and 
(d) The position of Latin America within the world order 
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expectations of the modern consumer 
society. Expectations include not only 
access to expensive durable goods 
but also "modern" suburban housing, 
foreign travel, and higher education. 
At prevailing per capita income levels, 
satisfaction of these tastes for minorities 
that are much larger than the previous 
elites implies patterns of income 
distribution, patterns of distribution of 
public expenditures on services and 
urban infrastructure, and patterns of 
saving, investment and production that 
are just as remote from conventional 
conceptions of developmental priorities 
as they are from the publicly endorsed 
principles of social justice. The in-
itiative for implantation of the new life 
styles has come mainly from the world 
centres through the transnational 
corporations and through standardized 
mass media content, but they have been 
readily internalized by the population 
strata having any capacity to do so. 
Similar processes have been at work 
in other regions of the Third World, of 
course, but for the most part the 
proportions of population affected are 
smaller, and the culturally or politically 
based resistance stronger . 
(Hi) The national populations represent 
a wide range of differing degress and 
forms of participation in or "marginali-
zat ion" from the " modern " soc iety. 
Social stratification has become more 
complex and the proportions of the popu-
lation in "middle" or "upper" positions 
has increased in most countries, although 
the meaning of these positions is far 
HSee Aníbal Pinto, "El Modelo de Desa-
rrollo Reciente de América Latina", Revista de 
Economía Latinoamericana, Caracas, 32,1971. 
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from uniform. The predominant charac-
ter of the lower strata has changed 
with urbanization, increasing spatial 
mobility and access to mass communi-
cations, and with the partial disinte-
gration of "traditional" rural power 
structures, but without any generalized 
decrease in the polarization between 
them and the fully "modernized" 
minorities. At the same time, the 
obstacles to national integration are less 
complex than in most other parts of the 
Third World. The national populations 
are not divided along linguistic, cultu-
ral, religious, caste or tribal lines in such 
a way that any developmental process 
involving differential advances and 
polarization between internal regions, 
urban and rural populations, and social 
classes generates conflict between 
readily self-identifiable groups, as in 
much of Africa and Asia and a few of the 
small Caribbean countries. The preva-
lence in the region of the latifundio-
minifundio complex and exposure to the 
changing demands of export agricul-
ture have prevented peasant cultures and 
forms of community organization from 
acquiring the capacity for resistance to 
change that they have exhibited in 
other regions, although these factors 
continue to be of some importance in 
the zones inhabited by linguistically 
separate "Indian" peasants. In general, 
the impact of present change processes 
on rural groups results in their 
disintegration and "marginal" incorpor-
ation into the lower strata of the national 
society, or in some cases in the appea-
rance of modern forms of self-defence 
such as peasant unions, rather than 
in traditionalist, messianic, or cultural-
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nationalist reactions. The rural popu-
lation, while in most countries large 
and still growing, is a dwindling pro-
portion of the whole, is in the main 
accustomed to wage labour and market 
relationships, and is continually drain-
ed of its more dynamic elements 
by out-migration. While it would be 
risky to extrapolate present trends into 
the long-term future, they suggest a 
continuing conflictive combination of 
homogenization of cultural attitudes 
and consumption expectations with pola-
rization of incomes and of capacity 
to participate in the "national" society. 
The attention of all groups and strata 
will increasingly concentrate on the 
State as the most likely source of aid 
in meeting expectations. Localistic 
and regionalistic rivalries will continue 
to be prominent, but will centre on the 
distribution of central public resources 
rather than on separatism vis-à-vis the 
nation-state. 
(iv) The per capita income statistics, 
which show the Latin American countries 
in an intermediate range between 
Europe and North America, on the one 
hand and Africa and Asia on the other, 
with some overlapping at the ends of 
the range, obviously combine the very 
different situations of the well-to-do 
"modern" minorities and the remainder 
of the population. However, the 
predominant traits of poverty in Latin 
America, except in some of the smaller 
and more rural countries, are inter-
mediate between the traits of poverty in 
the high-income countries and in the 
very low-income countries. Poverty 
amounting to acute physical deprivation 
or semi-starvation and complete lack 
of access to educational and health 
services is still the lot of millions of 
people in Latin America, but it is less 
prevalent than in much of Africa and 
Asia. The predominant characteristics 
of poverty are changing with urbanization 
and the expansion of State assistential 
action. Insecurity of employment and 
income, overcrowded housing in squalid 
environments, inability to stretch the 
family budget to cover a minimum 
"decent" standard of living, including 
purchases of manufactured consumer 
goods, the frustrations of limited and 
discriminatory access to educational, 
health and welfare services, come to 
the fore. In the larger countries, present 
income levels would permit the relief of 
extreme physical deprivation through 
State subsidies, special employment 
programmes, etc., without major 
changes in the style of development, 
but this would hardly affect the 
dimensions of poverty as a condition 
of relative deprivation and discrimination. 
(v) As might be expected from the 
relatively high levels of urbanization, 
the prolonged internalization of the 
"Western" model of nation-state, and 
the relative weakness of alternative 
focusses for loyalty (ethnic or religious 
group, tribe, local community), a 
conscious acceptance of the State as 
final arbiter, as responsible for "solving 
problems" and "meeting needs", and 
as a legitimate target for blame if 
problems are not solved has become 
more generalized than in most other 
parts of the Third World. The State's 
assumption of responsibility for planning 
development, the influence of inter-
national standards, and the forms of 
political competition continually press 
the State to promise more than it can 
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perform, bearing in mind the resources 
and administrative mechanisms at its 
command and the capacity of different 
social forces to resist, evade, or distort 
public policies. The objectives of 
channeling resources into investment 
for rapid economic growth, helping the 
modernized urban strata to satisfy their 
consumption demands, and helping 
to raise the productivity and levels of 
living of the remainder of the population 
continually conflict with each other 
in practice, however reconcilable they 
may be in the proposals of planners. 
Policies that camouflage the real sources 
and distribution of public resources, 
that rely on chronic inflation, and 
that alternate manipulated self-help 
participation of the masses with 
repression become unavoidable. Dif-
ferent "problems" and "solutions" 
assume prominence with changes in 
régimes, then recede into the back-
ground, apparently because the State's 
solutions have proved ineffective while 
the growing dimensions of the "problems" 
do not have the catastrophic effects 
predicted (the wasing and waning 
public visibility of urban "marginal" 
settlements is an interesting example). 
For the most part, the political systems 
of the region have demonstrated 
considerable resilience and adaptability, 
underlying their surface instability, in 
juggling problems and responding to 
pressures. When the contradictions 
generated by a given direction of policy 
or political compromise seem insoluble, 
the dominant forces somehow reassert 
themselves to preserve the main features 
of the prevailing style of "development". 
When one moves from generalizations 
about Latin America as a whole to 
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the examination of specific national 
situations, the societies fall into groups 
that suggest interesting hypotheses 
concerning the long-term viability of 
this prevailing style. 
(i) The national societies at the highest 
levels of urbanization and per capita 
incomes, with inequalities in incomes 
and in distribution of services somewhat 
less pronounced than elsewhere, with 
low or declining rates of population 
growth, and with relatively extensive, 
formalized and long-continued political 
participation, have encountered the 
most disruptive and persistent political 
and economic crises of the region. In 
Cuba these crises led to a revolutionary 
transformation of the society and the 
emergence of an entirely different style 
of development. While pre-revolutionary 
Cuba is hardly comparable, in its 
extreme economic dependency on a 
single crop for a single market and 
in the associated political dependency, 
with the countries next to be mentioned, 
the pre-revolutionary Cuban society 
and economy were predominantly 
"modernized" and urbanized, the 
country was less heterogeneous 
structurally than the majority of Latin 
American countries, with extensive 
political participation and unionization, 
and it had relatively well-developed 
although notoriously inefficient edu-
cational and social security systems. 
The inability of the State to reconcile 
the pressures on its resources manifested 
itself in an eventually non-viable 
combination of corruption, repression, 
bureaucratism and violence. In two 
other relatively urbanized, modernized 
and participatory societies, Chile and 
Uruguay, inability to meet conflicting 
APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT: WHO IS APPROACHING WHAT? / Marshall Woffe 155 
demands or maintain satisfactory rates 
of economic growth has resulted in the 
disintegration of previously highly 
stable systems of political bargaining 
and the attempted restoration of the 
viability of the conventional style of 
development through authoritarian 
suppression of incompatible demands 
and pressures. In a fourth relatively 
urbanized and modernized society, 
that of Argentina, the outcome of a 
similarly prolonged crisis is still in 
doubt. The Argentine economy has 
shown more resilience, partly, no 
doubt, because of its greater size and 
diversification, but inability to mobilize 
consensus behind a coherent national 
strategy or to attain a stable system of 
political participation within the limits 
of the prevailing style of development 
has been as pronounced as in the other 
countries mentioned. 
The attainment of respectable 
ratings in the conventional indicators 
of development and modernization — 
per capita income; urbanization; edu-
cation; cultural homogeneity; popu-
lation structures with declining fertility, 
low mortality, and moderate percent-
ages in the youthful "dependent" 
age group — thus do not guarantee a 
more stable social order nor continuing 
progress in the direction of the "ad-
vanced" Western model. The examples 
cited suggest, on the contrary, that the 
attainment of such ratings in dependent 
societies can be associated with a 
prolonged crisis in which the economy, 
the political system, public services, 
and social relationships are less and 
less able to meet the demands made 
on them. Two cautions are appropriate, 
however: firstly, a comparison of ideal, 
stable, socially integrated "advanced" 
Western societies with the apparent 
impasses of the "semi-developed" or 
"dependency developed" societies may 
be misleading or premature: indeed, 
the former societies may be entering 
impasses of their own not radically 
different from those of the dependent 
societies; secondly, the societies just 
described all have unique characteristics 
that may explain in part their difficulties, 
and they reached their situations of 
"semi-development" at specific historical 
conjunctures that are not likely to be 
repeated; thus it would be risky to 
affirm that they point to the future of 
the societies next to be described. 
(ii) Five countries comprising more 
than two-thirds of the population of 
Latin America, while differing widely 
among themselves, correspond best 
to the generalized picture of polarized 
development and structural heteroge-
neity. All of them have relatively large 
populations — ranging from about 
12 million to about 100 million — 
growing at rates around 3 per cent 
annually, and extensive national 
territories, parts of which are only 
beginning to be opened up for exploi-
tation. Each has at least one urban 
centre of 2.5 million or more inhabitants 
growing by more than 5 per cent 
annually. Each has experienced 
considerable and diversified industrial 
growth and agricultural modernization, 
very unevenly distributed by internal 
regions. Each has an extremely 
heterogeneous population — compared 
to the first group of countries although 
not compared to the typical national 
societies of Africa or Asia — in regard 
to degree and forms of incorporation 
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into the "modern" economic and social 
order. In each, rapid modernization 
has increased the relative size of the 
groups enjoying the higher income 
and consumption levels, widened the 
gap between their levels and styles of 
life and those of the rest of the 
population, and introduced new elements 
of insecurity and partial breakdown 
of previous life styles in the rest of the 
population, whether or not absolute 
levels of living have deteriorated. All 
of these societies have experienced 
crises of political participation in recent 
years, but up to the present the dominant 
forces have managed to overcome the 
crises without long-term interruption 
of economic growth or transformation 
of its polarized character. It has proved 
feasible either to exclude the greater 
part of the population from political 
participation or to manipulate such par-
ticipation so as to prevent the articulation 
of demands incompatible with the style 
of development. 
Among these five countries, Vene-
zuela comes closest to the first group 
in degree of urbanization, per capita 
income level, and various indicators 
of modernization, and it is in the same 
population size range as Chile and 
Cuba, but it differs profoundly in the 
rapidity with which the present configu-
ration has been reached, the role of 
oil revenues in supporting polarized 
development while permitting simul-
taneous rapid growth of social services 
and public works employment, and the 
continuing high rates of population 
growth and rural exodus. Venezuela 
at present seems particularly exposed 
to the kind of prolonged crisis of 
participation and conflicting preferences 
encountered in the first group of 
countries, but also particularly well 
endowed with potential means of post-
poning or evading the crisis. 
In Brazil, the size of population and 
territory, the extreme diversity of 
internal regions, the dynamism of the 
economy, and the capacity of the 
dominant forces to exclude pressures 
incompatible with the style of develop-
ment imply potentialities qualitatively 
different from those of the other 
countries with somewhat similar patterns 
of modernization, polarization, popu-
lation growth, etc. Brazil has a bigger 
capacity to take advantage of op-
portunities for agressive incorporation 
in the world economic order than any 
other country of the region. 
Mexico also has enjoyed special 
advantages for rapid growth in having 
a relatively large population, an 
abundant low-cost labour supply, 
proximity to the United States market 
and tourist trade, and a unique system 
for the channeling of political partici-
pation. However, the ratio of resources 
to population, the size of the internal 
market, and the capacity to exclude 
incompatible pressures are less favou-
rable to continued growth than in 
Brazil. To judge from past experience, 
however, the political system has a high 
capacity to absorb major structural 
changes without unmanageable crises. 
In Colombia, economic growth, is 
more diversified spatially than in the 
other countries of the group, but it is 
less dynamic, and the crisis of political 
participation and conflict over the style 
of development itself is nearly as 
pronounced as in the first group of 
countries. 
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In Peru, the processes of polarized 
economic growth and dependent 
modernization that characterize this 
group of countries took their present 
shape more recently and are more 
limited in scope. The conditions for 
their continuation also seem more 
problematic. The population is smaller 
than in the other countries of the group 
except for Venezuela. Only about one 
third of the population lives in centres 
with 20,000 or more inhabitants, while 
the other four countries have percentages 
between 40 and 60. The "modern" 
sectors of production, the internal 
market for their goods, and the 
population groups fully committed to 
the prevailing style of development are 
correspondingly smaller and more 
concentrated in the single metropolitan 
agglomeration. Cultural heterogeneity 
is greater than elsewhere and "tra-
ditional" social relationships and modes 
of production more persistent. While 
the natural resource endowment is 
relatively promising and there is a good 
deal of unoccupied land, barriers of 
topography and climate hinder the 
expansion of settlement and exploitation 
of new resources more than elsewhere. 
It would be risky to draw a cause-and-
effect relationship between these factors 
which make the viability of the 
conventional style of development 
particularly doubtful — or at least make 
its probable costs in terms of dependence, 
marginal i zation, and repression of the 
majority that cannot be incorporated 
particularly formidable — and the 
coming to power of forces that propose 
radical changes in the conventional 
style in order to counteract polarization 
and dependency, promote national 
cultural integration, and implant harmo-
nious forms of participation to forestall 
unmanageable political competition. 
(Hi) The remaining eleven countries 
of Latin America share the features of 
smaller population size and lower levels 
of urbanization. Only one out of the 
eleven (P an am a) has as much as 40 
per cent of its population in centres 
with 20,000 or more inhabitants (a 
little below the regional average). The 
others are all below one third; four are 
below one fifth. Only one (Ecuador) 
has even as much as half the population 
of the smallest country in the second 
group. One might expect countries 
with these traits to be less advanced in 
the path of polarized development than 
the larger countries in the second group, 
less capable of meeting (at least on 
their own) the conventional requirements 
for "development" listed above, and 
more dependent for economic growth on 
the fortune in the world market of one 
or two raw material exports. The reality 
corresponds on the whole to this 
expectation, but the small countries 
show widely differing combinations of 
advantages and disadvantages internally, 
in their links with the world order, and 
in their links with their larger neighbours. 
With one or two exceptions, all of them 
have acquired a "modern sector" and 
a developmental momentum implying 
constraints on radical changes in the 
style of development similar to those 
noted above, although possibly weaker. 
Several of them have overall configura-
tions that make one hesitate to include 
them in the category of "relatively less 
developed". 
Three of the countries in this group 
have extensive territories and resource 
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endowments in relation to their small 
populations. All of these three are on 
the South American continent, juxta-
posed with much larger countries 
belonging to the first and second groups. 
One of them, Ecuador, which has the 
largest population and second highest 
level of urbanization among the small 
countries, has a pattern of resource 
endowment, regional diversity, and 
economic and cultural heterogeneity 
similar to that of Peru. It also has the 
possibility of oil revenues on a scale 
that might enable it to reach a 
configuration similar to that of Vene-
zuela or, under the guidance of dominant 
forces with a coherent strategy, support 
an original style of development with 
less traumatic accompaniments than 
would appear in the more urbanized 
and "modernized" countries. Bol ivia 
has a particularly high ratio of unex-
ploited land and natural resources to 
population, but particularly formidable 
and varied difficulties of topography, 
internal regionalism, cultural heterogene-
ity, lack of capital, and weakness or 
incoherence of the forces controlling the 
State apparatus that hinder it from 
using these advantages. Anomalously, 
it also manifests, to a degree unmatched 
even in the countries of the first group, 
a chronic crisis of organized demands 
from different groups and classes that 
can be reconciled with the real style of 
development only precariously and 
intermittently. In Bolivia, the societal 
obstacles to the implantation of a 
radically original style of development 
are relatively weak and the character of 
the demands on the State suggest that 
such a style might be the only way out 
of an impasse of permanent instability 
and economic weakness. However, the 
capacity to devise and impose the 
necessary style or to mobilize capital, 
natural resources and human resources 
behind it is also weak. In Paraguay, the 
ratio of land to population is favourable, 
and problems of topography and cultural 
heterogeneity unimportant. With a low 
level of urbanization (a little over one 
fifth of the population in centres with 
20,000. or more inhabitants) and with 
Argentina absorbing as migrants a 
high proportion of the population 
groups that would otherwise contribute 
to urban growth and modernization, 
both the pressures making for polarized 
development and the demands deriving 
from it seem to be moderate. 
The other small countries — two in 
the Caribbean, six in Central America — 
are grouped in a way that makes them 
less dependent on 1 arge neighbours, 
more capable of group action, but also 
more narrowly constrained politically 
as well as economically by the world 
order. One of them, Panama, has a 
unique entrepot role that has permitted 
a relatively high level of urbanization 
and dependent modernization which, 
through the high visibility of the tie 
to one of the world centres, stimulates 
a nationalist reaction implying a certain 
degree of viability for an original and 
autonomous style of development. 
Another, Costa Rica, with relatively 
low urbanization and an economic base 
as narrow as the neighbouring Central 
American countries, along with an 
extraordinarily high rate of population 
growth, has attained a degree of 
modernization, cultural homogeneity, 
diffusion of social services, etc., that 
resembles those of the highly urbanized 
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countries of the first group, with sizeable 
problems of political participation and 
reconciliation of demands on public 
sector resources, but without an 
unmanageable breakdown of consensus 
or interruption of economic growth. 
The case of Costa Rica cautions against 
determinism concerning the limitations 
of small dependent societies. As in 
Uruguay in the past, certain historical 
circumstances permitted the emergence 
of a democratic and welfare-oriented 
national style that could not have been 
expected from the country's small size 
and dependence on exports of a few raw 
materials. In Costa Rica as in Uruguay, 
the prominent role of education has 
ambivalent implications for the future 
of the style; it stimulates occupational 
demands and modernized consumption 
patterns that the economic base cannot 
support beyond a certain point, but it 
may also prepare the youth to face the 
choices and fill the roles required for 
creative innovation in the style. 
The remaining small countries, with 
their predominantly rural populations, 
high rates of population growth, low 
educational levels, dependence on 
agricultural exports, modest reserves 
of land and unexploited natural 
resources, external political constraints, 
and restricted or intermittent political 
participation might seem to have small 
possibilities for either polarized 
development or for the implantation of 
more original styles, at least in the 
absence of more effective solidarity 
among themselves. Nevertheless, most 
of them have attained rates of economic 
growth that compare favourably with 
those of the larger countries, have 
acquired minorities of some importance 
identified with the "modern" consumer 
society, and are making some effort to 
extend social service and participation 
schemes to the rest of the population. 
The main obstacle in the way of their 
continuing along this path — assuming 
that the markets for their exports 
remain reasonably favourable and are 
supplemented by new sources of revenue 
such as tourism — may be their very 
high rates of population growth, 
eventually resulting in accelerated 
urbanization and unmanageable demands 
for services and jobs. 
The above brief survey of national 
situations suggests that it is unlikely 
that any of the societies can incorporate 
the entire population into the "modern" 
life style at satisfactory levels of 
consumption and services, but it may 
be economically feasible for most of 
them to expand the incorporated part 
of the population considerably and at 
least to keep the levels of living of the 
rest of the population from deteriorating. 
This assumes that there is no major 
breakdown in the world economic and 
political order. If present favourable 
trends in raw material demands continue, 
the economic feasibility of continuation 
of the present style will naturally be 
strengthened, along with reluctance of 
the nationally dominant forces to 
undertake the risks of major changes. 
The likelihood that the style of polarized 
development will prove non-viable lies 
more in the contradiction with expanding 
political participation than in economic 
contradictions. The least manageable 
participation may be that of the 
relatively incorporated parts of the 
population, with their attempts to 
respond to ever-changing " advanced" 
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consumption models rather than that 
of the excluded or "marginally" incorpo-
rated groups with their relatively modest 
demands. Thus, paradoxically, the 
closer the approximation of the societies 
to the models of modern urban life styles, 
the more difficult it may become for them 
to resolve struggles over distribution of 
resources and strategies of development 
through open political processes. 
It may be, however, that this kind 
of analysis misses the most important 
factors — in particular, the factors 
mobilizing political will behind a de-
termined development policy or prevent-
ing the implantation of a coherent 
policy. The differing situations and 
trajectories of the national societies 
The present paper supposes — with 
reservations — that development is a 
legitimately identifiable process subject 
to certain uniformities and preconditions, 
but that these uniformities and pre-
conditions are not rigidly binding nor a 
satisfactory basis for prediction of the 
future. It also supposes that human 
reason and human values can and 
should try to shape the future into 
national styles different from those 
prevailing up to the present . "Develop-
u 
This position is set forth in the Report 
on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis 
cannot be expl ained satisfactorily on 
the basis of their demographic structures, 
social structures, resource endowment, 
degree of urbanization, etc., although 
there is sufficient correspondence to 
justify the above grouping. In each 
country, a long chain of cultural and 
historical processes and unique 
"accidents" shape present patterns and 
make certain developmental choices 
more accesible than others — victory 
or defeat in wars, revolutions generating 
national myths as well as changes in 
class relationships, the emergence of 
charismatic leaders capturing the 
lasting loyalty of major parts of the 
population, the persistence of traditional 
political affiliations and locaiistic 
sentiments under change conditions. 
and Planning (op. cit., pp. 9-10): "Develop-
ment" is "a perceived advance toward specified 
ends based on societal values" and also "a 
system of interrelated societal changes that 
underlies and conditions the feasibility of the 
advance". "The first sense assumes human 
capability of shaping the future for human 
ends. It also implies that the existing society 
has the right and the ability, through general 
consensus or through agents claiming to 
represent the best interests of the society, to 
make choices and enforce sacrifices in the name 
of development." "The second sense assumes 
that development is an intelligible phenomenon 
susceptible to diagnosis and objective propo-
sitions concerning the interrelations of factors 
and the probable wider consequences of changes 
in or action on key components of the'system'." 
3. 
Policy approaches to the challenge of "unified". 
"original", and "value-oriented" or 
"human-oriented" styles of development 
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ment" cannot mean anything anyone 
wants it to mean, but, if it is to continue 
to serve as a focus for human aspirations, 
it must embrace a certain range of 
differing combinations of ends and means. 
Three main kinds of approach to the 
definition of these ends and means can 
be distinguished: the Utopian-normative, 
the technocratic-rationalistic and the 
socio-political. Up to a point, these are 
complementary. The pursuit of more 
acceptable and viable styles of develop-
ment must be referred to images of the 
future social order — in other words, to 
a "utopia" — and to norms setting 
limits on the means to be used. The 
quest for more rational and efficient 
techniques for mobilization and allo-
cation of resources, provision of services, 
and accomplishment of whatever 
objectives the society sets itself is 
unavoidable, whatever caveats may be 
entertained as to the lengths to which 
this quest should be followed and the 
virtues of the market or of participatory 
democracy. Finally, social and political 
forces, however these may be defined, 
must choose the utopias and norms 
and create and apply the technocratic-
rationalistic planning and administrative 
mechanisms. 
For obvious reasons, the utopian-
normative and technocratic-rationalistic 
approaches have received a good deal 
more attention in official and semi-
official international discourse than the 
socio-political. The fact that such 
discourse is conducted by government 
representatives or by "experts" addres-
sing themselves to governments, as the 
opening section of the present paper 
points out, promotes the supposition 
that the governments stand for rational, 
benevolent and coherent entities 
preoccupied with development and the 
welfare of all their people, anxiously 
seeking advice on how to accomplish 
these ends, and capable of acting on the 
advice. If their behaviour does not 
correspond to this image, they deserve 
scolding for corruption, for the pursuit 
of irrelevant objectives such as military 
power, for slackness and evasiveness 
in pursuing their declared policies (in 
Gunnar Myrdal's words for being "soft 
States"), but the supposition remains 
that the "government" or the "State" 
has sufficient autonomy to do better if 
"it" wants to, or if "it" is sufficiently 
alarmed at the dire consequences of 
not doing better. Non-official academic 
and ideological discourse, particularly 
in the "developing" countries, shows a 
different world, in which external 
domination and internal distribution 
of power determine what governments 
can do, in which the governments are 
commonly incoherent aggregates of 
diverse personalistic, bureaucratic and 
other purposes, and in which it is naive 
or intellectually dishonest to expect 
them to act differently on the basis of 
moral exhortations or rational arguments. 
The utopian-normative and the tech-
nocratic-rationalistic approaches have 
to a large extent been pursued separa-
tely, by different groups in the national 
governments and the intergovern-
mental organizations, but the advo-
cates of each have tried to borrow 
strength from the other. The proponents 
of universalistic social norms have 
aspired to guide the technocratic plan-
ners and administrators, and have com-
monly exaggerated the power of the 
planners and the results to be expected 
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from "convincing" them of the im-
portance of social justice or placing 
spokesmen for the "social" point of 
view in planning bodies. The planners 
and administrators have commonly 
tried to justify their techniques and 
enlist wider support by hinting at 
eventual contributions to the attain-
ment of social justice. 
In recent years both of these 
approaches — although numerous 
institutions continue to elaborate and 
teach them along previous lines — 
have been increasingly frustrated by 
confrontation with socio-political re-
alities and increasingly complicated or 
adulterated by attempts to adjust them 
to these realities or adjust the realities 
to them. Apologies for both approaches 
fall back continually on what might be 
labelled the "bureaucratic passive 
voice" or on the wistful assertion of a 
"growing awareness" in order to evade 
the obligations to identify the socio-
political agents to whom they are 
addressed. Enough has been said about 
the uto pi an-normative approach in 
previous sections of this paper. Its 
shortcomings when pursued in isolation 
(or its illegitimate uses as an evasion 
of reality) are cruelly exposed in a world 
in which the dimensions of injustice, 
insecurity and violence continue to grow 
while the list of "rights" to which all 
human beings are entitled by the votes 
of their governments continues to 
lengthen. The confrontation of the 
technocratic-rationalistic approach with 
recalcitrant realities is more complex, 
since its practitioners are more intimately 
involved in the machinery of the State, 
the demands of classes and groups, and 
the need of the political leadership for 
"solutions" to "problems". One result 
has been an extensive literature on the 
"crisis in planning"10. As in the case 
of "development" itself, if the meaning 
previously attached to planning is 
discredited, it is assumed that "planning" 
must mean something else, and the 
alternatives proposed range from a 
continuous, diffused rationalizing 
activity in which the whole society 
participates, to the formulation of 
operational guidelines for short-term 
choices between projects. Public adminis-
tration as a "discipline" shows a similar 
loss of confidence and diversification of 
prescriptions, combined with a similar 
clinging to faith that it must mean 
something generalizable and applicable 
to the rationalization of what the State 
does in the name of society. One critic 
has retorted: "If planning is everything, 
maybe it's nothing" . 
l0See, in particular, Mike Faber and 
Dudley Seers, Ed., The Crisis in Planning 
(Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, 
two volumes, London, 1972). See also section 
in of "Report on a Unified Approach to Develop-
ment Analysis and Planning", op. cit. 
""Despite intermittent disaffection with 
planning — the contrast between the plan and 
the nation mocked the planners — it was difficult 
for national elites to lose sight of the promised 
land. They so wanted an easy way out of their 
troubles. Besides, they soon discovered that 
the non-operational quality of planning could 
be helpful. . . • Formal planning may be useful 
as an escape from the insurmountable problems 
of the day. ... If groups cannot be indulged in 
the present, they can be shown the larger places 
they occupy in future plans. Formal planning 
can also be a way of buying off the apostles of 
rationality by involving them in tasks that take 
them away from the real decisions. . . . If formal 
planning fails not merely in one nation at one 
time but in virtually all nations most of the 
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From the standpoint of the present 
paper, the utopian-normative and 
technocratic-rationalistic approaches can 
time, the defects arc untitely to be found in 
maladroit or untalented planners. Nor can a 
failure be argued rationally by saying that the 
countries in question are not prepared to behave 
rationally or to accept the advice of rational 
men called planners. That ¡s only a way of saying 
that formal planning, after innumerable iterations, 
is still badly adapted to its surroundings. It 
cannot be rational to fail. To err is human; 
to sanctify the perpetuation of mistakes is 
something else. If governments persevere in 
national planning, it must be because their 
will to believe triumphs over their experience. 
Planning is not so much a subject for the social 
scientist as for the theologian". (Aaron 
Wildawsky, "If Planning is Everything, Maybe 
It's Nothing", Policy Sciences, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, 4, 1973.) A similar conclusion was 
foreshadowed several years ago in Albert O. 
Hirschman's well-known comment on the plan-
ning activities of CI-PAI.: ".. . CEPAi.'s design 
has a Utopian ring for societies where simple 
ministerial changes frequently mean total 
reversals of policies and where the policy makers 
themselves take pride in being unpredictable... 
CKPM.'S detailed projections where all economic 
sectors are made to mesh harmoniously are in 
a sense the twentieth — century equivalent of 
Latin America's nineteenth century constitu-
tions — and are as far removed from the real 
world. They are a protest, both pathetic and 
subtle, against a reality where politicians relying 
on brilliant or disastrous improvisations hold 
sway, where decisions are taken under multiple 
pressures rather than in advance of crisis and 
emergency situations, and where conflicts are 
resolved on the basis of personal considerations 
after the contending parties have revealed their 
strength in more or less open battle rather than 
in accordance with objective principles and 
scientific criteria". ("Ideologies of Economic 
Development in Latin America", in A.O. 
Hirschman, Ed., Latin American Issues: Essays 
and Comments (New York, Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1961.) 
escape from* the blind alley of verba-
lism and ritual action only to the extent 
that their proponents relate them 
to socio-political approaches that 
identify agents and propose strategies 
consonant withi the values, interests, and 
capabilities of these agents. This 
position,, however, is vulnerable to 
criticism from several directions; it 
certainly does not offer any straight-
forward or universally "applicable" 
"solution" to the problem of advancing 
towards original and value-oriented 
styles of development. The kinds of 
agents of development that are sought 
and the range of choice attributed to 
them in the shaping of a style of develop-
ment naturally depend on the conception 
of development and the interpretation 
of the nature and functioning of human 
societies. There is no a priori reason to 
assume that the agents "needed" for an 
acceptable and viable style of development 
will emerge in any given socrety, or that, 
if they do emerge, they will be able to 
accomplish their "historic mission", 
or that if they do accomplish such a 
mission, the society will be unequivocally 
and permanently better of than before. 
Nor does it seem necessary to assume 
a priori that the same kind of agent, 
whether collective and acting out a 
predetermined role, or individual and 
with a large measure of free will, must 
play deus ex machina in all societies, 
as most schools of theory and ideology 
assert. The would-be intellectual agents 
of development — the last of the five 
categories distinguished below — might 
well assume that any of the categories 
can be decisive in certain conjunctures 
but marginal or even illusory in others. 
The five categories are as follows: 
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(0 Social classes and groups that fill 
key roles in the "working out" of a 
conventionally-defined style of develop-
ment, on the basis of their relations 
to production and their collective 
views of their own interests: entrepre-
neurs, investors, technological innovators, 
technicians, "middle classes", workers, 
etc. Collective agents such as these 
can fill their roles more or less adequa-
tely, or can find that the economic and 
social structure or the terms of 
dependency are incompatible with the 
filling of such roles adequately, but the 
associated conceptions of development 
do not allow for major creativeness or 
voluntarism in changing the style, 
whether the underlying conception is 
Marxian or non-Marxian. A large 
part of the discussion of styles of 
development in Latin America up to 
the present has consisted in attempts 
to identify plausible collective agents, 
to measure the adequacy of existing 
classes and groups to fill roles defined 
on the basis of previous examples of 
"development", and to explain why the 
classes and groups have rarely seemed 
to carry out the tasks assigned to them: 
take, for example, the persistent 
expectation that an "industrial bour-
geoisie" would remove a "landlord 
oligarchy" from its path by promoting 
agrarian reforms. The discussion has 
tended to reify the classes and groups 
looked to as collective agents, and in 
many cases, the agents to be discussed 
next seem, instead of "representing" 
them, to have brought them into being 
or into a distorted kind of self-
consciousness for their own purposes. 
(ii) Individuals or small groups that 
articulate the demands of larger groups 
or classes, act as brokers, and mould 
public opinion : politicians, leaders of 
trade unions and other interest-group 
organizations, journalists, religious 
leaders, etc. In view of the relative lack 
of coherence of the 1 arger groups or 
classes, agents of this kind are able to 
play relatively autonomous roles, but 
at the price of limited and precarious 
real capacity to enforce demands and 
influence change processes. Their 
apparent importance is likely to be 
suddenly inflated and deflated, as in 
the case of populist leaders elected to 
the presidency with large popular votes 
and then easily forced out of office. 
Their influence may depend more on 
their ties with the kinds of agents next 
to be discussed than on the groups they 
aspire to represent. As " agents of 
development" their effectiveness is 
limited not only by these factors but 
also by the importance of brokerage 
and manoeuvering in their roles. They 
are likely to view the advocacy of a 
"style of development" as an additional 
tactic to lend plausibility to the role or 
to reinforce more concrete objectives, 
rather than as an overriding purpose. 
(in) Individuals or small groups holding 
power deriving from control of armed 
forces, ownership of capital, or representa-
tion of one of the dominant world centres. 
Since the power of these potential agents 
does not depend on ability to mobilize 
support from part of the population 
and build coalitions, they might be 
expected to be in a position to act more 
coherently (or arbitrarily) in pursuit 
of a style of development than the agents 
in the second group. Their applicable 
power, however, is limited by several 
aspects of their own situations: (a) Their 
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primary power rests on a specific 
conjuncture and can suddenly disappear; 
the military leader can be ousted by his 
subordinates, the capitalist can be 
crippled by a financial crisis, the world 
centre may be diverted by internal 
problems or its overall political strategy 
may shift so as to undermine the 
position of its representative, (b) The 
power holders' values and conceptions 
of their own roles do not usually extend 
to the implantation of an original style 
of development; they are more concerned 
with the preservation of existing order 
and warding off threats to their privileged 
position, (c) Their detachment from 
the representation of large classes or 
groups limits their capacity to induce 
the population to act in accordance 
with their objectives. Once they set 
themselves the task of implanting a 
coherent style of development, they 
must enlist the aid of agents of the 
second type, attempt to fill these roles 
themselves, or find effective means of 
isolating the population from political 
appeals and interest-group represen-
tation. 
(iv) The chief of state or national 
executive: the individual or collective 
entity formally responsible for public 
decision-making, appointment of public 
functionaries, broad choices concerning 
allocation of resources, formulation of 
guidelines for development. This entity 
is the conventional target for develop-
mental advice, the modern succesor 
of Macchiavelli's Prince. Utopian-
normative and technocratic-rational 
prescriptions are formally addressed to 
the Prince; a good deal of the more 
recent socio-political discussion addresses 
the question: How to give him advice 
that he can use, on the assumption 
that he is playing a difficult game with 
limited "political resources" and in-
adequate information? In practice, 
the Prince may turn out to be elusive, 
even in authoritarian settings; his 
formal representation decides very 
little and absorbs hardly any of the 
advice showered on him; the real 
sources of decisions are dispersed and 
hidden13. 
In particular, Warren F. Ilchman and 
Norman Thomas Uphoff, The Political Economy 
of Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1969). According 
to their "simplifying assumptions", "first, the 
statesman has at his command limited resources, 
in varying amounts and types, with which to 
implement choices affecting the character and 
quality of the polity's collective life; second, 
as a result of the division of labour that defines 
authority roles in a society, the statesman alone 
has the resource of authority at his disposal; 
third, the statesman wishes to remain in 
authority; and fourth, the statesman, to realize 
his valued ends, will make choices that formally 
aim at increasing the productivity of his political 
resources" (p. 33). "In the face of frequent 
mutual exclusiveness of demands and the 
persistent scarcity of resources, the statesman 
has various options. He may choose to meet 
some demands wholly or in part. Some demands 
he will ignore or explicitly reject. Sometimes 
when a demand from the sectors cannot be met, 
the statesman may seek to substitute resources 
that he thinks will be temporarily acceptable; 
... He may employ coercion to remove the effects 
of certain demands, or he may institute education 
to remove the causes. ... Given the necessity 
of choices, the statesman must figure out on 
whom, how much, in what combination, when, 
where, why, and for what return the regime's 
scarce political resources should be spent" (p. 38). 
l3
"There is, as a rule no single and 
invariant 'locus of sovereignty'. Sovereignty is 
shared among various groups in different 
constellations at different times. ... The 
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(v) Individuals or small groups aspiring 
to explain the functioning of a society 
articulate images of preferable future 
societies based on their values and on 
their diagnosis of the existing situation, 
formulate corresponding strategies, 
and enlist support from one or more of 
the preceding types of agents. A well-
known remark by John Maynard Keynes 
summed up forty years ago the potentia-
lities, shortcomings, and dangers of 
their influence on the other agents: 
"...the ideas of economists and 
political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are 
more powerful than is commonly under-
stood. Indeed the world is ruled by 
little else. Practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist. 
Madmen in authority, who hear voices 
in the air, are distilling their frenzy from 
some academic scribbler of a few years 
back. I am sure that the power of vest-
ed interests is vastly exaggerated 
compared with the gradual encroach-
ment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, 
but after a certain interval; for in the 
field of economic and political philosophy 
there are not many who are influenced by 
new theories after they are twenty-five 
or thirty years of age, so that the ideas 
which civil servants and politicians and 
existence of a cabinet (or a junta) may conceal 
the extent to which the decision-making process 
is, in fact, dispersed". (Colin Leys, "A New 
Conception of Planning?" Crisis in Planning, 
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 60.) 
even agitators apply to current events 
are not likely to be the newest ". 
These last "agents of development" 
include the proponents of the Utopian 
normative and technocratic-rationalistic 
approaches discussed above, to the 
extent that these try to confront the 
socio-political application of their 
prescriptions. They notoriously offer 
a bewilderingly wide range of prescrip-
tions, none of which have as yet been 
incontrovertibly successful in their 
contacts with reality. They fall into 
three roughly distinguishable groups : 
the planners, the reformist-meliorists, 
and the revolutionaries. 
The planners, as the most conspicuous 
representatives of the technocratic-
rationalistic approach, have already 
been discussed. For a brief period the 
impression gained ground in circles 
concerned with development that neutral 
techniques had been devised or were on 
the point of being devised that could be 
"applied" by any government taking 
them seriously so as to bring forth a 
predictable product — "development". 
This impression has gone by the board, 
and the planners have been scolded 
repeatedly — and have scolded them-
selves — for their isolation from political 
realities and the inadequacy of their 
techniques. They have tried to 
l4John Maynard Keynes, The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1936, p. 
383-4). 
The following remarks by Dudley Seers 
are representative: ".. . his approach is 
likely to be static. The planner's university 
education is not likely to have provided him 
with much help in thinking about how economies 
operate at different levels of development 
(and with different institutions). He is hardly 
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define their relationships to political 
agents, to associate themselves with 
"participation", to find means of 
transforming rather than furthering 
the prevailing style of economic develop-
ment. The question then arises, as 
Wildawsky suggests in the quotation 
above, whether they retain any plausible 
case for remaining a "discipline" 
with common techniques, offering 
definable services to public policy, 
whether they are not merging into the 
other categories of intellectual agents 
of development. To the extent that the 
planning approach remains distinct, 
and its practitioners do not resign 
themselves to ornamental roles and 
academic exercises, it supposes the 
possibility of completely rational man-
agement of human affairs in pursuit 
of quantified goals . . . if only the 
correct prescription can be discovered 
and the right agents convinced of its 
prepared, therefore, to look at the economic, let 
alone the social, realities and ask how the 
resources of the country might be mobilized for 
change —as some politicians would really like 
him to do... It is especially likely ...that the 
planner will fail to understand the extent to 
which political realities determine the geo-
graphical patterns of government expenditures 
or the sources of foreign aid. .. -His social 
life brings him into contact with the (usually 
articulate) residents of the capital; so indeed 
does his official life. ... Yet the population 
of the capital is very different in income, oc-
cupation, etc., not merely from that of the 
countryside, but also from the public in other 
cities. ... the planner will tend to incorporate 
in his model the myths prevalent in the capital 
about the consumption and production functions 
of the rest of the country. ... Perhaps most 
significant of all is the planner's attitude to 
the quality of the statistics he is using ... the 
correctness and marshalled to apply 
it.16 
The reform ist-meliorists have in 
common a distrust for utopias, infal-
lible technocratic prescriptions, and ca-
tastrophist demonstrations that a pre-
vailing pattern of growth and change 
cannot continue because it functions 
unjustly and inefficiently. They aspire 
to understand socio-economico-political 
structures so as to work within them for 
value-oriented ends, on the supposition 
that these structures are never going to 
be perfectly rational and oriented to 
human welfare, on the one hand, nor 
irremediably oppressive and incompat-
ible with value-oriented development, 
on the other. National consensus on 
17 
societal goals is not to be expected. 
economics student is taught to handle numbers 
as if they were objective facts, instead of being, 
as they usually are, nothing more than 
enlightened guesses". ("The Prevalence 
of Pseudo-Planning", The Crisis in Planning, 
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 25-28). 
16 
"If planning is a universal tool, 
planners find it reasonable to ask why their coun-
tries cannot live up to the requirements of 
rational decision-making. If planning is valid, 
they feel, nations should adjust to its demands 
rather than other way round. To save planning, 
planners may actually accept the blame. For 
if better behaviour on their part would make 
planning work, the solution is not to abandon 
plans but to hire more talented planners." 
(Aaron Wildawsky, op. cit.). 
"There is no such thing as a collective 
national 'objective function'. There is rather 
a complicated mix of goals, which may be under-
stood partly in terms of a limited number of 
themes around which there is something like 
consensus or for which there is at least a substan-
tial majority support, but which for most of the 
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Uncertainty is a permanently unavoidable 
concomitant of human affairs, and 
development is an open-ended process 
calling for flexible tactics to take 
advantage of opportunities as they 
present themselves. The reformist-
meliorists prefer to act in societies 
with open political competition and 
articulate interest-groups, but they are 
not surprised nor moved to withdraw 
from attempts to influence policy if these 
conditions are not present. They do 
not see revolution as a precondition to 
an acceptable style of development, but 
if revolutions occur they view them as 
new concatenations of challenges and 
opportunities, to be studied sympatheti-
cally. The reformist-meliorist outlook 
permits a subtle appreciation of the 
complexities of policy-making and the 
ambiguities of most change processes 
in terms of their impact on human 
welfare, but it also supports a certain 
Panglossian smugness, a predisposition 
to find reasons for affirming that all is 
for the best, if not in the best of all possible 
worlds, at least in as good a world as 
humanity has any {reason to expect, and 
that incremental reforms combined 
with human genius for muddling through 
18 
will gradually make it a little better. 
time is fluid and changing. At different moments, 
different groups have priority and different 
perceptions of self-interest and collective interest 
dominate. The planner's problem is to be able 
to build plans around a limited number of goals, 
isolated from the rest, for which a necessary 
minimum of support appears to be assurable 
during a necessary .minimum period." (Colin 
Leys, "A New Conct^ g®n of Planning?", Crisis 
in Planning, op. cit., V#*J,'p. 72.) 
'"Albert O. Hirschman has labelled 
this approach "reform-mongering", and has 
In practice, reforms and spontaneous 
developmental processes that have been 
hailed as shining examples have so 
often later collapsed or stagnated that 
the reformist-meliorist approaches, like 
the technocratic planning approaches, are 
less credible than a few years ago. At best, 
they offer no comfort to the international 
demands for an immediate end to 
poverty and injustice. Nevertheless no 
convincing real alternative is at hand for 
the international organizations and the 
"experts" aspiring to influence policy 
within concrete national situations 
— however much intellectual allegiance 
they may owe to utopian-normative and 
technocratic-rationalistic schemes. 
The revolutionary or "counter-
planning" outlook — to the extent that 
it is not contaminated by technocratic or 
reformist-meliorist hopes — starts from 
the premise that the existing socio-
political order is radically incompat-
ible with a value-oriented style of 
development, or with full unfolding of the 
human potential. Therefore — depend-
ing on the diagnosis of the stage this 
order has reached, the way it functions, 
been one of its most avowed and ingenious 
practitioners. See, in particular,-4 Bias for Hope: 
Essays on Development and Latin America 
(New Haven and London; Yale University 
Press, 1971). The writings of Aaron Wildawsky, 
John Friedman, and Albert Waterston, along 
with most of the contributions to Crisis in Plan-
ning, op. cit., offer variants on the approach. 
The most explicit formulations of it come 
from the English-speaking countries. Elsewhere, 
there seems to be more reluctance on the part 
of persons concerned with development policy 
to acknowledge it as a guiding principle and as 
a virtue, although their practical tactics cannot 
help following it. 
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and the constraints imposed on national 
action by the world order — the primary 
task is either to demolish it or to promote 
its ripening to a point at which demolition 
will become feasible. The agents that 
have been previously assessed —classes 
and groups, their mobilizers and 
spokesmen, holders of primary power, 
the personified State or national 
executive — and the policies advanced 
by technocrats and reformist-melior-
ists are then assessed in terms of their 
potential contributions to demolition, 
the accomplishment of stages of "deve-
lopment" leading to ripeness for 
demolition, or the strengthening of the 
existing order against demolition. The 
place of the agents in an eventual value-
oriented style of development and the 
concrete policies required recede to a 
secondary level of speculation or become 
confused with the immediate instrumen-
tal role of agents and policies. In 
relation to national societies undergo-
ing polarized and dependent "devel-
opment" the revolutionary outlook is 
bolstered by the obvious and persisting 
lack of correspondence of the existing 
situation with human values, and the 
abundant evidence that the best-
intentioned technocratic and reformist-
meliorist schemes are either ineffectual 
or contribute to the polarization between 
classes and groups. At the same time, 
the outlook is fragmented and frustrated 
by the failure of the societies to meet the 
preconditions for revolution set by the 
theories underlying the revolution ary 
outlook. The "proletarian" class that 
should be the grave-digger of the existing 
order is not growing markedly in relative 
size nor organizational coherence and 
seems more disposed to uphold the order 
than to overturn it. The "marginalized" 
or "sub-proletarian" strata whose well-
being seems most incompatible with 
perpetuation of the existing order, in 
their ambiguous relations to the systems 
of production and employment and to 
the State, respond poorly to coher-
ent revolutionary appeals. Moreover, 
the pervasiveness and complexity of 
present economic, political and cultural 
interdependence with the world centres 
suggests that demolition of the existing 
order at the national level will either 
be altogether impracticable or will 
imply costs in terms of societal disruption, 
repression and enforced closure of the 
society, that would make posterior 
value-oriented development problematic. 
To the extent that this last constraint is 
acknowledged the national revolutionary 
must take into account international as 
well as national "ripeness" for change. 
The revolutionary rejection of the 
existing order as a framework or starting 
point toward a style of development 
deserving support can obviously lead 
to a wide range of different tactical 
conclusions. The revolutionary can 
concentrate on the task of immediate 
demolition, or at least of making the 
existing order unworkable, on the as-
sumption that this will help generate 
the preconditions for transformation. 
Or he can try to redefine the preconditions, 
experiment with tactical alliances, and 
await favourable conjunctures in a 
manner indistinguishable from the 
reformits-meliorist approach except 
in the underlying suppositions. Or he 
can try to create and mobilize support 
for a utopia so compelling that its appeal 
will outweigh unfavourable objective 
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conditions. And the reformist-meliorist positive in their capacity to generate a 
tactics may, in the end, even find some dynamism that their own views of needed 
variants of the revolutionary outlook changes require but cannot muster19. 
4. 
In lieu of conclusions 
The above exploration of approaches to 
development, starting from the question 
"Who is approaching what?", has 
encountered many different would-be 
agents acting within many different 
combinations of opportunities and 
constraints, in pursuit of an objective 
that is continually being redefined, 
falling back on verbal and organizational 
rituals for lack of ability to foresee and 
control the course of events, and 
sometimes violently rejecting reality 
for its failure to conform to their concepts 
and values. One finds, internationally 
and nationally, a chorus of agreement 
on the need for "unified", "human-
oriented" approaches to development, 
combined with real concentrations of 
power, resources, and public attention 
on aims that are either irrelevant to such 
approaches or obviously incompatible 
with them. One finds that the promotion 
of "development" has become an 
industry in which supply creates its own 
continually diversifying demand for 
"experts", in which conferences beget 
conferences and declarations beget 
declarations, in which major "problem 
areas" incorporating different con-
ceptions of developmental priorities 
continually hive off organizationally, 
receive symbolic recognition in "years", 
inflate themselves to cover all aspects 
of "development", and spawn infinitely 
ramifying co-ordinating mechanisms. 
Under these conditions, explorers sent 
out with instructions to find a "unified 
approach" to development risk assuming 
two folkloric roles at once — that of the 
blind men describing the elephant and 
that of the mice discussing how to bell 
the cat. 
Such an exploration is inevitably 
unsettling to the proponents of utopian-
normative, technocratic-rationalistic and 
socio-political approaches, to the re-
volutionaries as well as the reformists. 
At the end, all on them can be expected 
to retort: What positive, practical 
proposals do you have? The present 
paper, of course, does not set out to 
demolish previous How to Develop 
prescriptions and then propose an 
infallible new one, nor to reject previous 
societal candidates for the honour of 
leading the way to development and 
then nominate different agents who can 
" . . . there is a special justification 
for the direct search for novelty, creativity, and 
uniqueness: without these attributes change, 
at least large-scale social change, may not be 
possible at all. For, in the first place, the powerful 
social forces opposed to change will be quite 
proficient at blocking off those paths to change 
that have already been trod. Secondly, 
revolutionaries or radical reformers are unlikely 
to generate the extraordinary social energy they 
need to achieve change unless they are exhilarat-
ingly conscious of writing an entirely new page of 
human history". (Albert O. Hirschman, A. 
Bias for Hope, op. cit., p. 28.). 
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really do the job. As was indicated at 
the beginning, this paper is a personal 
by-product of a continuing policy-
oriented research project that has 
formulated certain proposals, without 
pretension to the discovery of a develop-
mental panacea. These proposals which 
in the main select and re-combine ideas 
already current in international develop-
mental discourse, are being published 
elsewhere. 
This paper does not argue that any 
of the approaches it describes are 
illegitimate or altogether on the wrong 
track, although it does suggest that each 
of them in different ways lends itself to 
over-simplification and mystification. 
It really points to an existential approach 
to development, in which the would-be 
agents should cultivate an awareness 
that theirs is a possibly Sysyphean task 
of trying to impose a measure of value-
oriented rationality on realities that 
will remain permanently recalcitrant to 
such rationality. All societies that 
survive will have to strive to "develop", 
in the sense of enhancing their capacity 
to function over the long term for the 
well-being of their members. None 
will ever reach a blessed terminal state 
of "being developed". Apparent suc-
cess may, in the long term, lead into 
a trap of relative incapacity for further 
innovation. From this point of view 
all national societies at all points of time 
and at all levels of poverty or prosperity 
confront a certain range of accessible 
alternatives with different combinations 
of advantages and disadvantages. The 
capacity of their dominant forces to 
choose specific alternatives depends 
not only on objective conditions but 
also on their subjective appreciation of 
these conditions and on the momentum 
of what as already been done. Choices 
or failures to choose are continually 
closing doors and opening different 
ones. If opportunities are not seized, 
if choices do not correspond to realities, 
if capacity for adaptation and innovation 
fail, then in the words of W.H. Auden, 
"History to the defeated may say alas, 
but cannot help or pardon". Neither 
can the international development 
movement. 
The international demand for a 
"unified approach" is aimed at in-
terpretations and strategies of de 
velopment more directly oriented to 
social justice and the meeting of basic 
human needs than heretofore. Such 
interpretations and strategies will not 
be any more "unified" in a literal sense 
than their predecessors. In fact, they 
are bound to be more diversified than 
the strategies concentrated on maximi-
zation of investment and production, in 
their striving to reconcile multiple 
objectives, respond to differing national 
potentialities and values, and enlist 
creative popular participation. The 
change of focus from a "unified approach" 
to exploration of the viability and 
aceptability of differing "styles of 
development" within specific national 
settings recognizes this. The attempt 
to introduce the theme of "styles of 
development" into international dis-
course, however, is not immune from 
the temptation to seize upon verbal 
novelties, new pack aging for old 
prescriptions, token solutions that do 
not match the magnitude of the problems 
to which they are addressed or the 
intentions of the power structures that 
would have to apply them. The present 
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paper from its vantage point within 
international developmental discourse, 
has been — perhaps obsessively — 
preoccupied with this temptation. It 
looks back over a quarter of a century of 
international reports speaking of suc-
cessive "growing awarenesses" of the 
need for more "balanced" or "com-
prehensive" approaches to development. 
If awareness had really grown at such a 
rate the international community should 
have attained total enlightenment by 
now. 
Ideally, the "unified approach" 
should embrace the whole human race 
and the international community should 
attach a positive value to diversity in 
styles of development, if only for the sake 
of experimentation and cross-fertiliza-
tion, as long as they do not diverge grossly 
fr(om the international consensus on 
human rights and values. Within these 
limits, each national society should be 
free to pursue its own style and to count 
on the co-operation it needs to do so. 
In practice however, no national society 
is in a position to evolve its own style 
without careful attention to external 
constraints and manoeuvering within 
the limits of the practicable. The 
meeting of needs through international 
co-operation remains precarious, in-
hibiting, and in part illusory; national 
societies striving to develop cannot 
dispense with such co-operation, but 
neither can they lean on it, particularly 
when they leave the conventional paths. 
Finally, the very conception of "national 
soc ieties" "choosing" styles of de-
velopment is of dubious applicability to 
many of the countries now on the world 
stage. The recognition of the legitimacy 
of alternative styles of development and 
of the possibility of value-oriented 
choice is a step forward from the 
conception of a single path to be disco-
vered and followed, under penalty of 
permanent backwardness, but it leaves 
more questions than it answers. The 
present paper is intended mainly to 
stimulate would be agents of develop-
ment to preoccupy themselves with these 
questions, and it is appropriate to return 
to some of them at the end: Who is to 
choose a national style of development? 
Who gains and who loses? Are-the domi-
nant social forces able and entitled to 
commit a society to a given style? Will 
styles of development corresponding to 
the international norms for social justice 
set forth above, within the limits of 
austerity and sacrifice set by national 
resources supplemented by problematic 
external co-operation, really be ac-
ceptable to the articulate and organized 
population groups whose acquiescense 
will be essential, or even to the ideologists 
and planners who are calling for more 
equitable and autonomous styles? 
Will national societies in the real world 
be able to attain the degree of consensus 
and rational organization called for 
except at a price that will distort the 
new style into something quite different 
from the image of the just and free future 
society informing it at the beginning? 
